Untold Facts

Baseless Tainting of Historical Facts

The 21st June Verdict
That a division bench of the Bangladesh High Court passed a judgment on the 21st June (09) in re-fixing up a fact that is exclusively of the by gone days record of history of Bangladesh not known to be authentically challenged before in about four decades but occasionally by some loose talks of no importance. The bench is commendable for the pertinent fact that the case was settled just only in two months period after filing the petition in the backdrop of the well known facts that many more important and thousands of other more crucial cases have been remaining pending in the same system not for months or years but for decades without even coming in to the cause list!

Re-fixation of facts after 38 years
Despite the prerogative of the ‘independence’ of judiciary that we all should feel proud of, it is difficult to appreciate that a bench of the High Court must fix by itself fact of past history! Possibly more curious and astonishingly amazing was the part of the dictate that ordered that all relevant past records in the matter not conforming to the verdict must be forfeited from the market for sale, distribution channel, etc. and even removed from the archives of Bangladesh! One has to ponder seriously and probe into depth if such verdict of any court unreasonably interfering, arbitrarily re-fixing and passing order for deleting facts of past history inside the country but certainly not outside the geographical border are there in any civilized country professing and practicing open democracy in the state systems. And as such the verdict is undoubtedly certain to be challenged in the higher judiciary by some sensible and patriotic persons/ forces.

The Two Actors of 1971
Political leader Sheikh Mujib and Army man Zia for whom the verdict was given had been two important actors well acknowledged in the 1971 independence movement of Bangladesh. There were not and should not have been any rivalry in respect of their roles in 1971. They played roles not exactly the same but qualitatively different and yet supplementary and complementary to each other. Zia being a army person had been straight forward, rebelled against his own army men (Pakistan Army Command), overpowered them and took the stand that neither of his comrades (Bengali) dared to take arms in hand in actual fight in war fronts nor any political leader including Mujib who though prompted and inspired the people politically as a mass leader. Thus it was very logical and reasonable that in there life time in 1970s and early 1980s there had been little known rivalries, much less antagonism between the two giants. It rather turned a matter of curiosity that the next generation of both the genres have picked up the controversy after three decades in some points and issues that are of little material utility but almost useless so far as the nation faces many critical and rather life and death issues. One must wonder if some over enthusiasts of the ruling party thus by picking up the rather settled issue in somewhat childish way and imposing certain verdict on the nation that is only certain to create more chaos and instability in the country not for any tangible benefit of the country but for ulterior design and evil gains of the big neighbor, in particular.

The Major and the Big Wigs
In1971 Zia had been a Pakistan Army young serving major, but Mujib then a quite mature and elected political leader of the largest part of the independent Muslim State of Pakistan, what was then known as East Pakistan (historic East Bengal). Mujib’s rise to leadership owed primarily in the 1970 general election to alleged disparity between the two geographically isolated and the two regions separated 1000 miles away from each other. In fact, the general election results though had the semblance of unity of the two wings of Pakistan under the LFO (Legal Framework Order, 1970), two different parties won landslides in the two wings, the Pakistan People’s Party in West Pakistan and the Awami League in East Pakistan giving rise of two leaders Z A Bhutto in the West and Sheikh Mujib in the East. The Martial Law President of the Federal Pakistan fell in dilemma of the two leaders, apparently, in acrimony for power at the center in Islamabad. The war of words between the two pitched each day high and higher for ascending to the power, despite the fact that power ascendancy at the center was no issue in the LFO.

The LFO
The LFO had just only provided for framing an acceptable and durable Constitution for Federal Pakistan in a limited period of 120 days following publication of the results of the 1970 general election, failing to do the only job the Assembly would automatically dissolve itself.

Flouting the LFO
How come that though the election was conducted under the provisions of the LFO for the only purpose of framing the Constitution, the Awami League leader Mujib, in particular, whether in open concert with the PPP scheming leader Bhutto and in likely connivance with Pakistan’s well known ‘number one enemy’, India, started to orchestrate for forcible power capture particularly in East Pakistan/ Bangladesh having had little or no care for the whole country that our worthy forefathers in 1940s willfully and democratically through fair polls created and established in high price of sacrifices in properties, wealth and lives lost in millions. Even so, people in East Pakistan seemed to prefer hand-over power of East Pakistan to Mujib, particularly, in midst of the marathon negotiations that went on between the Military President (Federal) Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto in Dhaka between the 15th to the 24th March 1971. Many people had this expectation for the fact that as many wished on the 7th March public speech of Mujib at the then Ramna Race Course that he would declare UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence of East Pakistan), but he did not do so except made a utterly confusing political rhetoric, EBARER SANGRM AMADER MUKTIR SANGRM, EBARER SANGRAM SWADHINATAR SANGRAM. Let me put on record here again that I myself then at my mid thirties teaching in a Government College in Dhaka (Dacca) was present there with deep interest and exclusively to listen from the horse’s mouth that the UDI would come out from his person but I heard nothing so to my wonder, amazement and also a bet lost for UDI to one of my Awami League friend and a provincial M.P., now late Safar Ali Mia Engineer, a financier of Mujib.

My own Recalling of Early 1971
The day of 25th March, so far as I could recall now after 38 years, had been a day of rumors and tense. I had waited at my 11 Holy Cross College Road Farm Gate IDE office until about 11 at night when I drove off on my self driven new car FIAT 600 D (Dhaka Ka 2906) bought from USA scholarship money savings to my official residence 5/G polytechnic Senior Staff Quarters, Tejgaon Industrial Area, had late dinner and went on to sleep as usual but with some anxiety. Soon we all woke up with five young children, my wife and myself and two younger dependants in midst of heavy sounds of shelling and fire flying over my residence top 4th floor. I got all lying on floor and watched with awe and fear what was going on at that dead of 25th March past mid night. Shelling over my residence, a flat of block of 32 flats soon stopped. But there were similar sounds heard and fires seen from many other places. Thus passed the 25th March night. The next morning we knew rumors about resistances at places like the EPR (BDR), Rajarbagh police Lines, etc. Apart from these fearful fights people knew only about a political action program of Hartal call by the Sheikh on the 27th March. But rumors were in air that the Sheikh had been arrested before midnight on the 25th March that was soon confirmed from various foreign media sources. While the people were in utter confusion in the absence of the Sheikh in leadership, many of us in Dhaka knew that in the absence of the Sheikh, and in overcoming the confusion as to what the people to do, an unknown Major of the East Bengal Regiment of the Pakistan Army had declared independence of Bangladesh on the 26th March and also assumed himself the Presidency of independent Bangladesh based at Kalurghat Radio station near Chittagong, 200 away from the capital city Dhaka. The next day, on the 27th March, we knew that on insistence of some of Zia’s close colleagues, nothing of any whatsoever indication from Mujib, there was no scope of any for the two had nothing of any prior contact much less knowledge of each other, he amended the announcement in inclusion of Mujib’s name for more acceptability to the people in the declaration of independence. These are the versions we knew in Dhaka, authenticated by many later on, one like National Professor Syed Ali Ahsan, etc. as also writer and researcher Masudul Haq painstakingly recorded relevant facts in his books Bangladesher Swadhinata RAW O CIA er Bhumika and Swadhiatar Ghoshosna Myth O Dalil. It may not be irrelevant to mention here that Mujib did not only stick to his street program for Hartal on the 27th March that he asked Tajuddin to enforce in his rhetoric SANGRAM CHALIYE JAO, but also repeatedly asked Dr Kamal until late at the 25th night (10:30 P.M.) if the much sought for lone telephone call from Yahya Khan had come or not. Kamal is still alive, and if not for anything else but to put record of history straight he should honestly open his mouth about Mujib’s nod of the UDI before he was taken to custody by the federal army men just before midnight of the 25th March. These chains of duly recorded and authenticated facts should suffice to prove that Mujib did never made UDI of Bangladesh. Neither did he give any consent to any one much less to what some 76 M.P.s (35 according to Barrister Maudud) did on the 10th April (did in fact on the 17th but backdated 10th April, again according to Maudud) in Kolkata and in Delhi. One must reason dispassionately that they had no authority either for they had not been elected to frame any Constitution of Bangladesh so far as the December 1970 election mandated by the LFO was concerned, because, they were meant to frame the Constitution of the Federation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Mujib’s Allergy about Secession
That any such UDI would have been secession that Mujib had all along decried and condemned not only after the election of 1970 but also on many occasions before during the Awami League’s 6 Point propaganda rhetoric. That must speak clearly of his mind as to do nothing of the sort of Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh (UDI).

Major Zia’s Rebellion
It is true that some special coterie acting from within and without in the vacuum of leadership between 25th and 26th March circulated some statement said to be given by the Sheikh for UDI that never got authenticated, much less believed by even averagely intelligent people. What many people, however, listened to and believed that one Major Zia had declared independence of Bangladesh on the 26th and repeated then after wards from the Chittagong Kalurghat based temporary 10 KW transmitter station.

Indira’s doubt
Even the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi later on, seriously doubted the fact that Mujib had at all make the UDI when she clearly pointed out in meeting with Tajuddin, Moustaque etc. soon after the 25th March in Delhi stating that no General could surrender to the enemy immediately after declaring war for independence. In fact, Mujib had been young Muslim League cadre and fighter for establishing Pakistan in his Islamia College student days in Kolkata (Calcutta) in 1940s. Though he later on dissociated from the Muslim League, albeit, not before founding of Pakistan but two years after in June 1949 and joined Maolana Bhashani and Suhrawrdy in the Awami Muslim League, not for doing any harm to Pakistan but for working as a formal opposition party to build up still stronger Pakistan that he reiterated even after Bhashani’s exit from the Awami League and Suhrawardy’s demise in 1963. Indira’s skepticism thus about UDI by Mujib was not without any basis. This is not to say though that there were no seriously committed others in the second line of leadership who wished by all means to effect secession, dismember Pakistan and secure independence of Bangladesh. That is why the Mujibnagar based Exile Government Prime Minister Tajuddin had to face humiliation in the hand of Mujib in independent Bangladesh. Professor late Aftab Ahmad from his own first hand knowledge asserted that Mujib had rebuked Tajuddin right at the Tejgaon Airport Tarmac on the 10th January 1972 just on arrival to Dhaka from captivity in Pakistan for dismembering Pakistan (having had Indian armed help). One may recall the fact that Mujib, in his three and a half years rule of Bangladesh (1972-Mid August 1975), did never make any time for even an hour to visit the renowned Mujibnagar (named in honor of his name in his absence by the devotees), the first capital of the Bangladesh Government in Exile! Why?

A.K. Brohi’s assessment about Mujib
I wonder if I could end up the item to insist further from other document that the Sheikh even at the height of his trying times of life and death in trial for ‘treason’ in mid 1971 in Islamabad stood for one and unity of the Federation of Pakistan including both of the East and West Pakistan that his Chief lawyer A.K Brohi, a well known person of the highest integrity not only in Pakistan but also elsewhere, in the case left document in London that very fortunately I had occasion to get to know personally being then in the city. Brohi’s dying declaration published in a fortnightly on the 25th September 1987 in London stated the relevant facts as follows:

‘Mujibur Rahman was being tried on the charge that he had been working for the secession of East Pakistan and according to Brohi he had absolutely denied the accusation. Brohi also personally believed that this was a true defence plea. Later on when India attacked East Pakistan, again, according to Brohi.Mujibur Rahman, offered to appear on the TV and appeal to the people of East Pakistan against Indian attack. He passed on the offer to the martial law administrator, Gen Yahya Khan. Apparently the offer was ignored.’ (Impact International, p.19).

Other Facts in Authentic Documents
Shall I mention some other recorded facts for others to ponder about from a document published recently about Mujib’s trial that noted that though the trial ended conferring death sentence to Mujib for treason in August, 1971 the President Yahya did never care to sign the paper of the sentence even if he had been in office for further five months duration until late December 1971 (See, Kamal Matin Uddin, Tragedy of Errors, p.235). Was it without any internal reason? One may have some inquisitive look into another document by Sarder Muhammad Chaudhury that provided some elaboration of continuing close relations of Yahya and Mujib from late 1969 (See, The Ultimate Crime, pp.98-99). President Yahya’s public declaration of the name of Mujib as the ‘Future Prime Minister of Pakistan’ could hardly be without any prior understanding. People as well knew from the very beginning that Yahya and Mujib would share central power following the election respectively as the President and the Prime Minister.

It may not also be out of place to cite from American Professor and historian Stanley Wolpert from his well researched work Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan wherein Mujib had been quoted verbatim from the tape recorded version of talks between Mujib and Bhutto in late December 1971 to early January 1972 just before President Bhutto set him free on the 8th January and sent him to London on his free choice to go to, then to Dhaka via Delhi. Some relevant verbatim of Mujib recorded therein are as follows:

‘… I told you it will be confederation. This is also between you and me…You leave it to me, .. absolutely leave it to me. Trust me….My idea was we will live together and we will rule this country. You know the occupation (Indian) army is there…’ (P.175)

Mujib termed the Indian MITRA BAHINI as the Occupation Force
That Mujib considered the Indian army of 1971 fighting for independence of Bangladesh as the occupation army mentioned to Dr. Henry Kissinger in a meeting in late October 1974 in Dhaka (See, US State Department declassified document published recently and also reprinted in the weekly Holiday, Dhaka, March 06, 2009). How come that Mujib blasted the Indian Amry’s intervention in 1971 war with disgust so much so as to call them ‘occupation army’, whereas, the official position had been known as the Indian MITRA BAHINI or allied friendly army!

My Conclusion
In sum I have no hesitation in my mind to state that Mujib had been a Pakistani, not a secessionist, and so he did not make the UDI in 1971 in any form whatsoever. Others had imputed the value to him but having had no authenticity, not even a nod of any kind he had provided. It was as such unbecoming of the High Court Bench to assign Mujib the label on the basis of pure hearsay and not on concrete evidence and authentic facts.

That Mujib did nothing of the UDI that possibly he could do in March 1971 and that in the omission the whole period of 1971 war lacked de jure legitimacy that had no immediate sight of legitimacy for Pakistan did not recognize the independence of Bangladesh that made him to rush on to hold a general election that was nothing of any due in terms of period elapsed after the previous election of 1970, but just only to get the legitimacy and some sort of ease of his own psychological guilt of the omissions of the 1971 episode that he over enthusiastically did passing a legitimizing resolution to power of ascendancy in the new Parliament elected in March 1973 though through mass rigging. Whether the hara-kiri was sufficient enough to make him legitimate in power in the absence of recognition by Pakistan until early 1974 remained another matter of de-jure legal question, if not de-facto one. After all, the post 1971 government of Bangladesh was not in anyway a revolutionary one that could have been so made for the war had been fought by all party combined and not alone by the Awami League. The post 1971 lone party Awami League government was, in fact, the legitimate continuation of the LFO based election of December 1970.

Based on the facts at my disposal and the assessment I made above, I am sure that the 21st June verdict given by the honorable High Court Bench fell far short of the authentic historical facts and thus has only dented our pride of the independence of judiciary.

Author: Dr.M.T. Hussain

Bangladesh: A Neighbors Playground?

Geo strategic Game

A small news item caught my eyes. Tambru Canal between Bangladesh and Myanmar was playing foul with us. It has been breaking our side of the bank while building territory to the other over the past few decades. Looked like we were totally oblivious of this game of nature and remained quiet about it. According to other reports, Myanmar laid claims to its maritime boundary extending far into Bangladesh territorial rights. India, Sri Lanka and Thailand had already made their respective claims in the bay that overlap Bangladesh territory. I think Bangladesh hasn’t done yet; I am not sure if there is any left to be claimed.

The way things are going, I am afraid we may find ourselves virtually landlocked soon. Foreign navies, ships and fishing trawlers will rule our southern estuaries and maritime waters, which they usually do now unabatedly without much challenge. And, we may perhaps have to pay royalty to find a passage to the sea soon.

From the west, north and east we are mostly wire-fenced, as if we are a bunch of untouchables and need to be contained. Waters in most of the 54 common rivers are controlled and siphoned off upstream by India at will before they can find their way into Bangladesh. The “shujala shufala shaisha shaymala (the green)” Bangladesh is fast converting into a barren land. During monsoons we get over flooded, at times without any rainfall within our borders. The encroachment on Bangladesh is a continuing process.

Of late, the Tipaimukh dam on river Barak, just a kilometer away from the border of Sylhet, has generated considerable concern and commotion in the country. Our government refuses to see anything but ‘benefits’ in it. Barak is the source of water for three major rivers of Bangladesh—Meghna, Surma and Kushiara. If Tipaimukh is implemented, the net ‘benefit’ to Bangladesh will be that most of its eastern half will be without water during dry seasons with all other collateral affects, the experts opine.

Foreign secretary of India, Shiv Shankar Menon, made an unannounced visit to Bangladesh last month, ostensibly to lecture our officials on the ‘benefits’ of Tipaimukh to Bangladesh. And our gullible ministers have since been playing the HMV. The foreign minister said Bangladesh would take up the issue with India if the project did not bring benefit to us, perhaps meaning let the project be implemented then we would weigh our benefit. The finance minister took solace saying that it would adversely affect the regions in India more than Bangladesh. While our all-knowing commerce minister termed the opponents of Tipaimukh virtually illiterate who, according to him, talked without any knowledge of the project. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that a few Awami followers seemed to find Indian criminality in the Tipaimukh.

We have observed that the government is talking more and more about dredging our rivers these days. While regular dredging is certainly important for river communication and water management, it can not be a substitute to the upstream diversion of waters. Is it diversion tactic of the Tipaimukh challenge?

Without pointing fingers at fixing responsibility, Farakka example is before us. Farakka was conceived in the 1950s, planned in 60s despite Pakistani objections and implemented in 70s. The UN, the JRC and umpteen bilateral agreements on sharing had no consequence on India’s unilateral withdrawal of waters upstream, depriving Bangladesh of its minimum share. It was in total violation of the terms of agreement and international laws. At that time too, we were told of many ‘benefits’ of Farakka before it was commissioned. Today, the western half of Bangladesh is fast turning into a barren land with patches of deserts. In addition, the encroachment of salinity in the deltaic belt adversely affected agricultural crops, sweet water fish and other marine products. Shortage of water in dry seasons increased arsenic chemicals, depleted subsoil water which is crucial for shallow and deep wells as well as for irrigation. We have been losing our environmental flora and fauna with the loss of green, vegetation and forestry. Experts can cite many more serious consequences of a death-trap like Farakka.

Mr. Mohiuddin Alamgir has a very informative article on Farakka and Tipaimukh in the New Age on June 15, 2009. The NFB posted in its internet site too.

I recall, in 1976 when General Ziaur Rahman decided to knock the doors of the UN, after repeated failure at the bilateral level on Farakka, India made it a laughing issue on the UN floors. They mocked the issue by commenting that next time they would bring a few Kalsis (pitchers) of water and give to Bangladesh. Finally, India succeeded to relegate the Farakka back to bilateralism. We know the rest of the story. The US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake gave a similar prescription the other day: resolve Tipaimukh bilaterally, perhaps hinting US would not support internationalization of Tipaimukh. Whose line is it anyway?

India said to have informed Bangladesh of the Tipaimukh project in 1972 with the same old assurances: it was a hydroelectric project, not an irrigational one and that it would help Bangladesh in controlling floods. It is strange we took it so lightly so long! With a burning example of Farakka, do we need to be fooled again?

India is big, powerful and has larger international clout. It has been bulldozing its will over its neighbors. It has largely been successful not to allow its smaller neighbors grow in stature by way of interfering in the growth of their indigenous institutions—be those political, economic or social. Many call it India’s hegemoism with neighbors so that it can reign supreme. Bangladesh is the worst sufferer in this game, thanks to the paid or unpaid agents within and outside. These agents seem to have been brainwashed to think that salvation of Bangladesh lies in the lap of India.

How many Farakkas, Tipaimukhs and Talpattis shall we need to let a section of our so-called intelligentsia understand what a big game our big neighbor is playing with us? An Indian general had already warned its authorities that Bangladesh should not be allowed to slip out of Indian radar screen. Isn’t it time for them to wake up and visualize how they are acting as pawns to this big game?

We should not have any conflict or contradiction with India’s size, power or its global ambition. We want to live as an independent and sovereign nation. Otherwise there was no need of 1971. We want friendship and cooperation with India and other neighbors; there are many areas we can help each other. But all these help and cooperation should be on the basis of mutual respect and sovereign equality. We should not subjugate ourselves to any terror tactics on corridors, transit facilities, Asian Highways, enclaves, Talpatti, border demarcation, maritime boundary and others at the cost of our sovereignty. We must remember world is a close and compact place today and nobody is isolated.

Recalling the poem of “Babui and Chorai Pakhi” that we all studied as toddlers, let us build our own house and be happy, rather than seeking passive happiness and false prosperity in the lap of a rich neighbor.

Author: A O Chowdhury, NY, USA

Tipaimukh: another Farakka in the offing?

Mohiuddin Alamgir reveals the implications and consequences awaiting Bangladesh and the Manipur state of India through the completion of the Tipaimukh Dam.

When completed in 1970 by India, the Farakka Barrage, around 18 kilometres upstream of Monohorpur, seemed a rather innocent venture by India at just ‘saving the Calcutta Port from silting’.

The reality was felt by the Bangladeshis over the next few decades as the entire south-western region of Bangladesh was affected due to the dearth of water. The country also faced long term losses in the agricultural, fisheries, forestry, industry, navigation and other sectors.

The barrage also caused some fatal damages over the years through floods, droughts, excessive salinity and depletion of groundwater. The then-Bangladesh government tried to solve the impending problem through bilateral talks immediately following the formation of the Indo-Bangladesh joint river commission (JRC) in 1972.

After being assured in the 1974 summit between the two countries that the Farakka barrage would not be put into operation before an agreement was reached on sharing the dry season flow of the Ganges between the two countries, Bangladesh allowed India to test the feeder canal of the barrage in 1975.

India commissioned the barrage and continued unilateral diversion of the Ganges flow, beyond the stipulated test period. The barrage had been operational without a water-sharing agreement till 1997, before the then-Awami League government finally managed to make the Indian government concede. In the meanwhile, Bangladesh’s economical activity and ecological health had been hugely affected.

Bitter experience has taught that the historic friendly relations Bangladesh and India share through their experience in the war of independence in 1971 have not always translated into deeds. Farakka, enclaves, killing of innocent civilians by BSF, maritime and land border demarcation, smuggling, subversive activities by the intelligence wings, both nations harbouring each others’ high profile criminals, the river linking project have been a thorn on the side of the apparent ‘friendly’ relations.

And now, the construction of Tipaimukh Dam threatens to affect north-eastern Bangladesh the way south-western Bangladesh had been affected by the Farakka. Despite India’s insistence that the dam has only been built to generate electricity and a lukewarm response from the government in power, in Bangladesh, citizens and environmentalists feel extremely concerned and many have vowed to resist the construction at all costs.

The Indian government recently resumed construction of the Tipaimukh on the Barak River, just a kilometre north of Jakiganj in Sylhet, which resulted in the recent, renewed interest on its affects. The construction work was stalled in March 2007 in the face of protests within, (people of the Manipur state of India are slated to be worst-affected) and outside, India for not following international conventions about the international rivers. The completion of the dam in 2012 will virtually dry up the Surma and the Kushiara rivers, thus choking the north-eastern regions of Bangladesh, say experts.

The Tipaimukh dam would also affect, while compounding the losses caused by Farakka, the country’s fisheries, agriculture, environment and water supply.

Abul Maal Abdul Muhith, the finance minister of Bangladesh and also the founder president of the green non-government organisation Bangladesh Paribesh Andalan (BAPA) points out, ‘India will be worse hit than Bangladesh and so the general people of India are also against the project.’

‘The region of Sylhet will be adversely affected if the Tipaimukh project is completed and most dangerously, if they make a barrage at Fulertala and withdraw water from Barak River, the whole region will have to face scarcity of water,’ says Major (retd) Hafiz Uddin Khan, vice chairman, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and former minister of water resources.

‘The free flowing Surma and Kushyara rivers will turn dry,’ he adds.

Due to the protests from the Bangladesh side, Shiv Shankar Menon, the Indian foreign secretary visited Bangladesh last month. He requested Bangladesh to send a group of dignitaries who will visit the Tipaimukh area to observe the actual scenario of the controversial project, as the Indian government is thinking seriously about the implementation of the project.

Given the current developments, it is rather understandable that the dam will be brought to reality. The overall implications and consequences brought about by the project may be even more fatal than we can perceive at the moment, as pointed out by experts.

The project

To be located 500 metres downstream from the flowing rivers of Barak and Tuivai rivers, the Tipaimukh dam lies on the south-western corner of the Manipur State of India. The rock filled structure, with a central impervious core, has a height of around 180 metres above the sea-level. Its reservoir will have a storage water capacity of 15,900 million cubic m with a maximum depth of 1,725.5 m.

Although originally considered, to only contain the flood water in the Cachar plains of Assam, the emphasis of the dam was also later placed on hydroelectric power generation. The dam will have an installation capacity of 1500MW with only a firm generation of 412MW (less than 30 per cent of installed capacity).

Tipaumukh Dam was first thought of in 1954 when the government of Assam requested its construction to the Central Water and Power Commission of India for ways to manage floods in the Barak river basin. The commission surveyed and rejected three sites by 1965 on two grounds. The sites were geologically unsafe and large-scale submergence of cultivable land made it economically unviable.

The North-Eastern Council of India intervened and after discussion with Assam, Manipur and Mizoram, the states through which the river flows, the Central Water Commission began investigations in 1977. In 1984, it identified a new site. The dam, it was then estimated, would cost Rs 1,078 crore. The project was shelved as it did not have the requisite environmental and management plans.

In 1995, the Brahmaputra Board, responsible for managing the water of Brahmaputra and Barak river basins in India, carried out studies and revised the plan totalling the estimated cost to Rs 2,899 crore.

People of Manipur began to take notice as the completion of the dam would immediately result in their eviction from the area where they had lived for the past hundred years. In order to appease them, environment minister Kamal Nath assured that resettlement issues would be taken care of and nothing would be done in haste, in 1995. In 1995, chief minister Rishang Keishing made a statement declaring that the state cabinet did not approve of the dam.

In 1998, the Manipur assembly passed a resolution not to implement the project. However, in 1999, the central government handed over the project to North-Eastern Electronic Power Co-operation (NEEPCO) under circumstances, which many social organisations allege are questionable. They claim that during a spell of the president’s rule, imposed in 2001, the governor approved the project.

Then in 2003, the Public Investments Board and the Central Electricity Authority of India cleared the project by which the costs had been revised to Rs 5,163.86 crore by NEEPCO.

Currently, the information fed to the Indian public details that the project is to be built primarily for flood control and power generation. Irrigation and other benefits will be spin-offs. Flood control will benefit some plain areas in Assam.

However, Manipur and Mizoram, are likely to bear the brunt of submergence. But they are to equally share, as the central government stipulates to the Manipur government, 12 per cent of the power from the project, free of charge while the rest will be taken by NEEPCO.

Bangladesh in peril

Adverse effects of the Tipaimukh dam, including environmental deprivation, economic crisis and drought, will be rather irreversible as pointed out by the education, primary and mass education minister Nurul Islam Nahid. ‘If India withdraws water from the Barak river, the free-flowing Surma and Kushiara rivers will dry up,’ he mentions.

Abdul Karim Kim, an organiser of the Sylhet Paribesh Andolon feels that besides other parts of Bangladesh, Sylhet will be gravely affected. ‘The dam’s completion will disrupt agriculture, irrigation, drinking water supply, and navigation and ground water levels. Sylhet will face the same consequences faced by the south western regions of Bangladesh.’

He explains that Surma-Kushiara, and its 60 branch and distributaries support agriculture, irrigation, navigation, drinking water supply, fisheries, wildlife in numerous haors and low lying areas in the entire Sylhet division and some peripheral areas of Dhaka division. The river system also supports internal navigation, wildlife in haors, industries like fertiliser, electricity, gas etc.

‘Around five crore people of Sylhet and Dhaka division will face problems as Surma and Kushiara will lose five feet water in the rainy season. Environmental degradation will take place massively, severely affecting weather and climate, turning a wet cooler environment into a hot uncomfortable cauldron,’ he says.

‘Within 15 years, after starting the project and withdrawing water from the Barak, there will be no water in the rivers,’ informs MA Matin, general secretary, BAPA.

‘Scarcity of water will cause siltation on river beds,’ says Engineer Muhammad Hilaluddin, chief director of Angikar Bangladesh. He explains that when high rainfall will occur in the catchments area of the dam, enormous quantity of sediment-laden flood water will be released. He adds, ‘this will cause a severity of flood in the Surma and Kushiara channels, already raised for low flow. This will further raise the water level causing floods in adjoining additional areas.’

Also, navigation in river channels in the Meghna will be affected due to depletion of water flow and consequent sedimentation and severity of flooding during the monsoon season. Surface irrigation will also be in danger. The Meghna-Padma river will have lower flow, accentuating saline backwater intrusion in the Padma channel.

‘The total agricultural sector of around 20 districts, directly and indirectly, will be affected,’ says Professor Anu Muhammad from the economics department in Jahangirnagar University. He adds, ‘The Barak-Surma-Kushiara-Meghna river system stretches about 946 km. Around 669 km of this is in the Bangladesh portion. If India withdraws water, the fate of this whole river system will be threatened.’

Many scientists, engineers and green activists feel that the completion of the Tipaimukh dam will increase the frequency of earthquakes in the adjoining region of both India and Bangladesh. ‘The north-east region of India is one of the six major seismically active zones of the world that includes north-east India and suburbs, and Bangladesh. The huge reservoir of the dam will create pressure on the ground of this region which is already a high alert zone for earthquakes,’ shares Hilal.

Protest in India

The people of Manipur state protested from the very beginning of the dam’s conception as they are to sacrifice the most. The unanimous verdict of the peoples’ affirmation was that the Tipaimukh Multipurpose Hydroelectric Project is not for the people, by the people or of the people of the Manipur.

As has been pointed out by the intellectuals and experts of the state, the 900 km long Ahu (Barak River) is a constant source of the socio-political, economic and cultural sustenance for the indigenous Zeliangrong and the many indigenous and non-indigenous communities, who live along its course in India and Bangladesh. These cultures have grown up along these rivers over the past few centuries.

The mega-dam proposed at Tipaimukh (Ruonglevaisuo to the Hmar people) will smother this particular source of life for them while also affecting their culture, anthropology, ecology and economy. As per estimates of the authorities, the project will also totally affect 311 sq km area of the state. More than 40,000 people will be rendered landless as 16 villages at the Barak Valley will be submerged while around 90 villages will be adversely affected.

As such, academicians, politicians, students and civil society organisations have formed the Action Committee against Tipaimukh Project (ACTIP) to oppose the project which will further deepen the cracks in Manipur’s already fissured society. The construction of the dam will also benefit some groups at the cost of others.

Matin says ‘more than 20 social and political organisations, representing the largest communities, ethnic groups and political interests are protesting against the dam. We have a good understanding with them.’ The leaders of the groups believe that the unviable project design will also drive a wedge between communities that live in a state of unremitting conflict between themselves and with the state.

He points out, ‘the Indian government is playing hide and seek with their people as they are, not only making hydro electric power plant to produce electricity, but also planning to make a barrage at Fulertala, located slightly upstream of the river Barak.’ He mentions that the original plan is to supply water to the areas of Rajasthan and other states from the Barak river, around 900 kilometres away from the Manipur state.

‘This is actually a good strategy by the Indian government as although around 180 MW of power has been offered to the Manipur state, it needs only 150 MW of power. The rest will be distributed to the other states,’ informs Hilal.

‘Besides these, the Indian government has already initiated works in the seven north eastern states, widely known as seven sisters of India, for 24 irrigation projects or dams,’ says Baki Billah, a member of the Communist Party of Bangladesh. He adds, ‘200 more are at the planning level. The construction of these dams or projects will also affect Bangladesh as these will eventually choke around 54 rivers in Bangladesh.’

Abul Mal Abdul Muhith expresses his doubts about the project, when he says, ‘the Indian government claims that the dam is simply a project to help the power problem of their country. How can we trust this after the bitter experience we have had with the Farakka barrage. Furthermore, when even the ordinary Indians are protesting against the project, it is worth contemplating how much it may affect Bangladesh.’

International river convention

The Tipaimukh Dam project was en- tirely developed and approved without informing the government of Bangladesh or involving its people in any meaningful exercise to assess the downstream impacts of the dam.

Since the river Barak is an international river, Bangladesh as a lower riparian country should have an equitable share of water. Moreover an access to the design details of the project, planning and design etc also is a right of the country.

‘We do not know what is going on there,’ says Mir Sajjad Hossain, member of Joint River Commission (JRC). He adds, ‘we came to know from our sources that India is planning a hydroelectric plant. India has not sent any official documents about the proposal.’ Ministers Abul Mal Muhith and Nurul Islam Nahid reiterated the same point.

‘The Indian government was asked to give data about the Tipaimukh Dam twice during the JRC meeting- in 2003 and in 2005, but they did not provide us with the data,’ said Hafiz.

As such, this is clearly a gross violation of co-riparian rights of Bangladesh. India has disregarded some major provisions of the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention on the Article 5(1) Equitable Utilization, (7) No Harm Principle, (9) Exchange of Information.

‘India is taking the privilege of being a big country,’ says Professor Nazrul Islam, chairman of the University Grants Commission and a renowned environmentalist of the country. He adds, ‘Bangladesh can do nothing but complain to the international communities.’

JRC and going international

‘JRC is a dead horse and good for nothing. They should be renamed Jhuliye Rakha Committee (Hanging on a matter),’ says Matin. He adds, ‘we were told that the Bangladeshi part of the committee could not produce satisfactory data due to their Indian counterparts non-cooperation in the JRC meeting.’

Nazrul Islam feels that the solution to the problem is through mutual understanding between Bangladesh and India and a more efficient role of the JRC. ‘Our government and JRC can request India to postpone or, better yet, stop the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam if possible. This can be done through bilateral diplomacy or through UN intervention,’ he says.

‘JRC should soon start negotiation on equitable sharing of water, according to our entitlement as a lower riparian of the international river Barak-Surma-Kushiara, through international forums and the UN,’ suggests Anu.

‘Unilateral withdrawal would be a gross violation of the UN Convention that regulates the use of water of international rivers/water courses. This should be done as soon as possible. Any delay in negotiation might end up in a pathetic situation, causing irreversible environmental, economic and hydrological chaos,’ urges Matin.

Muhith feels that data exchange between the two countries’ governments will help at solving the issue. ‘Bangladesh needs to have the design, survey data, drawings, maps etc. prepared by the dam authority in order to verify the adverse effects and also to initiate mitigation measures for the lower riparian Bangladesh.’

‘We are waiting for the official invitation from the Indian government that Shiv Shankar Menon, Indian foreign secretary, told us about during the visit,’ says Mir Sajjad.

‘Bangladesh will obviously respond to the invitation and will take the right decision through mutual co-operation, through which the general public of both countries will be benefited,’ hopes Nahid, the education minister and a member of parliament from Sylhet.

The Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Pinak Ranjan Chakrabarti, while talking to the media recently said that although India will have sole control over water flow at the proposed dam site, it will not hold it back.

‘The flow of river water and flood control will remain in the hands of India’, he told reporters after a courtesy call on communications minister Syed Abul Hossain at the ministry.

‘Tipaimukh Dam is a hydro-electric project that will generate electricity from the flow of water, and then will release the water back,’ he added.

Prime minister Sheikh Hasina said on May 27 that her government would form an all-party committee to report on the pros and cons of the proposed Tipaimukh barrage in India, before taking a decision on the disputed project.

‘We have to send a technical committee rather than a parliamentary committee to find out what is actually going on,’ says Hafiz.

‘The nation has to fight together to protest this project,’ he adds.

Choking north-eastern Bangladesh

* India has resumed construction of the Tipaimukh Dam on the Barak River which will virtually dry up the Surma and the Kushiara rivers, thus choking the north-eastern regions of Bangladesh
* The construction will disrupt agriculture, irrigation, drinking water supply, navigation and ground water levels. Sylhet will be worst hit
* Tipaimukh to be used only for hydroelectric power generation, say India
* The people of the India state of Manipur to be affected the most
* The parliamentary committee on water resources and technical experts to visit Tipaimukh

Source: New Age

Pinak’s Audacity Must Stop

Indian High Commissioner Pinak Ranjan Chakavarty’s audacity exceeded all norms of minimum decorum of a gentleman, let alone of a diplomat. That he claimed that the Bangladeshi experts had no authentic information and facts about the Tipaimukh Dam of India is the latest example of his audacity and deep hatred shown not only against the patriotic civil society but also against the people of Bangladesh.

Earlier, I recall, he reminded us, the Bangladeshi people, that we must all remain grateful forever to India and the Indian P.M. Indira Gandhi for the fact that it was due to India’s armed intervention that made Bangladesh independent in 1971. Through a brief protest note I made and published in a Dhaka daily right then, I reminded him that India also should remain grateful forever to Bangladesh that it was the Bangladeshi freedom fighters that in the main fought for nine months that was certain to make independent Bangladesh even if the Indian armed help was not there. More than that the war made India the unrivaled regional big power by dismembering Pakistan, India’s great rival in the region and ‘enemy number one’, and for that India should remain grateful to Bangladesh forever, as well.

On the Ganges water issue, in another occasion, he also reminded us that Bangladesh should not raise any voice but must remain happy whatever lower quantity of water they have been releasing down the Farakka Barrage point for Bangladesh during lean season than the quantum mentioned in the schedule of the 30 years treaty.

He keeps on saying things almost as a hate Bangladesh active politician of India bashing Bangladesh’s voices of national interests that goes against them understandably to keep Awami thinking perspectives and morale high in complete tune to serve India’s hegemonic interest best. One must wonder if the Bengali Pinak keeps on making all offensives against Bangladesh, because he has a perfect rapport with the present administration in Dhaka.

I, for one, must ask the government to reprimand Pinak for such undiplomatic attitude without further delay and also should request Delhi to withdraw Pinak from the position in Dhaka. Otherwise, I am afraid, the friendly relations of Bangladesh with India are certain to be seriously dented.

Author: Dr. M.T. Hussain

Water Scarcity and the Threat of Water Wars in South Asia – A Bangladesh Perspective

INTRODUCTION

South Asia is known for many wonderful and beautiful things such as its varied cultures, languages, religions, landscapes and peoples but above all it is known for its volatility and sudden outbreaks of violence and often brutal and destructive conflicts. The Indian subcontinent, as it was once known, was partitioned on the basis of religion in 1947 according to the concept of the two-nation theory. Since then several wars have been fought over territory, sovereignty and in one case for independence which eventually led to the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 as an independent nation-state. As things now stand the next war in the South Asia region could well be over water. This appears almost inevitable unless India adopts a more accommodative attitude towards its neighbour’s claims for reasonable and equitable water sharing rights. Recent history has, however, suggested quite the opposite with New Delhi ignoring the just demands of Bangladesh which as the lower riparian nation is wholly dependant for its survival on the regular and sustained flow of water coming through India from the Himalayas.

Since 1971 Bangladesh has generally adopted a defensive attitude in its relations with its large neighbour in recognition of the economic and military might of India . However, if New Delhi continues with its policy of draining the life blood of Bangladesh it is more than likely that this small but populous nation would be forced to take on a more assertive role in its relations with India and in realizing its just demands for water, as well as in addition to other contentious bilateral issues, could ultimately lead to conflict in the coming decade. Policy makers in Bangladesh are yet to wake up to this reality but as a new generation of leaders emerge faced with the calamitous consequences of the large scale withdrawal and diversion of water by India they may have few choices but to confront New Delhi in a more aggressive and confrontational manner. This may appear at first glance to be highly unlikely but with millions displaced by desertification and the numerous other adverse effects (some of which has wrongly been attributed to climate change to distract world attention to the actual causes of environmental damage in Bangladesh ) of the Indian water withdrawal policy such a scenario cannot be easily dismissed. Fueling this growing animosity would be decades of mistrust caused by an arrogant and duplicitous policy devised and practiced by India ’s politicians and diplomats in their dealings with Bangladesh.

BACKGROUND TO WATER SHARING DISPUTES

The very geographical location of Bangladesh makes it the lowest riparian country of more than 50 trans-boundary rivers. The waters of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and other trans-boundary rivers have been sustaining the life and living of millions of Bangladeshis. Without these waters, the livelihood of millions of Bangladeshis would come under severe stress. Unfortunately, since independence, Bangladesh has been observing with great concern, the gradual reduction of the dry season flows of the Ganges, Teesta and many other trans-boundary rivers due to anthropogenic interventions across the borders – primarily by India . Since its independence in 1947, India has made intensive efforts to harness and develop the water resources in the Ganges basin. The data indicates that India now has several dozen large barrages and other diversionary structures operating in the basin which are capable of diverting 100,000 cusec flows from the Ganges and its different tributaries. Moreover, India has constructed more than 400 major, medium and small storage dams in the basin area. Of these, the major storage reservoirs have a total capacity of 2221 billion cubic feet or 63 billion cubic meters (BCM). Bangladesh itself could not embark upon any such major development of the waters of the trans-boundary rivers including the Ganges in the face of uncertainties of its dry season availability from across the border. Moreover, the flat terrain of Bangladesh does not allow any storage of excess monsoon waters for use during the dry season and such projects would in any case be extortionately exorbitant for the country at its present stage of development and with its limited financial resources.

The consequences for Bangladesh of India’s policy of diversion and withdrawal of water have been both dramatic and devastating. Upstream diversion of the precious dry season flows of the Ganges has adversely affected the hydrology, river morphology, agriculture, domestic and municipal water supply, fishery, forestry, wildlife, industry, navigation, public health and biodiversity in large areas of Bangladesh dependent on the Ganges water. Western analysts have been duped into believing that these negative environmental affects are caused by climate change that will in a few decades result in the rise of sea waters that will inundate large areas of the country. However, the actual cause of increased salinity in the south-western region of Bangladesh has been India ’s diversion and withdrawal of water which allows ingress of sea water from the Bay of Bengal due to the reduced natural fresh water flows in the opposite direction during the dry season. Another extremely serious but indirect consequence of this water diversion policy is the contamination of ground water with arsenic. With the reduction of water from India millions in Bangladesh are now forced to access ground water which if pumped continuously over a prolonged period assists a chemical reaction that oxidizes naturally occurring arseno-pyrites deep in the soil resulting in the release of arsenic into the water – a process which may properly described as almost akin to mass poisoning. This consequential alarming degradation of the environment and water supply in south-western Bangladesh has already forced thousands to leave in quest of survival elsewhere. In the face of deteriorating human health, reduced economic productivity and loss of amenities, life and living in this part of Bangladesh people are becoming increasingly vulnerable, insecure and resentful. These are probably the prime causes of conflict between states if history is to be any guide.

THE FARAKKA BARRAGE PROJECT AND

DIVERSION OF THE GANGES WATER

If we leave aside the period between 1947-1971 when Bangladesh was called East Pakistan and considered by India as a hostile entity the likelihood of agreement on water sharing was obviously limited. However, it was during this period that Indian diplomacy became a byword for duplicity and this approach was to continue in its relations with Bangladesh after it obtained independence from Pakistan with the help of the Indian military - which in hindsight had very little to do with altruism or kind hearted generosity and more to do with Indian geo-strategic imperatives. In any case, it was on October 29, 1951 that the then Pakistan government drew the attention of the Indian authorities to the report of a scheme for diverting large amounts of dry season flow of the Ganges . Four months later, on 8 March, 1952 India replied that the project was only under preliminary investigation and described Pakistan ’s concern over probable effects as purely hypothetical. Again on May 22, 1953 India reassured Pakistan that the Farraka and Gandak projects (a tributary of the Ganges) were still being investigated and India would appreciate cooperative development of the water resources of the Ganges . Nine years after the issue was first mooted the Government of India announced that it was going ahead with the plan to build a barrage across the River Ganges at Farraka[i] and Pakistan was formally informed. Talks took place occasionally between 1961 and 1970 but real negotiation and consultations did not. By 1970 India completed construction of the Farraka Barrage. The 24 mile feeder canal was, however, not yet ready.

While the Indian government’s behaviour towards Pakistan during this 19 year period (1951-1970) is explicable on the grounds that both nations were inherently inimical towards each other having just fought two wars within just thirty years it is still not explainable why India would adopt the same negotiating tactics towards the new nation of Bangladesh which it had recently assisted in its liberation war? I have provided my own theory in my book `The India Doctrine’ where I draw attention to India’s policy of domination over South Asia and an underlying resentment over the 1947 partition which seemingly allows Indian policy makers to ignore the just grievances of its smaller neighbours and not merely in the area of water sharing but including the whole array of bilateral issues that now bedevil interstate relations in the region.

After Bangladesh gained independence in 1971 relations with India gradually deteriorated and this was reflected in negotiations between the countries over water sharing rights. The Governments of India and Bangladesh decided in March 1972 to set up the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC). One of the major functions of the JRC was to maintain liaison between the participating countries in order to ensure the most effective joint efforts in maximizing the benefits from common river systems to both the countries. The question of sharing the water of the Ganges was, however, kept out of the purview of the JRC, to be settled at the level of Prime Ministers. In this regard, many in Bangladesh felt at the time that the Awami League government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was too compliant and would easily buckle to Indian demands which actually turned out to be the case. The Prime Minister of India and Bangladesh met in New Delhi in May 1974 and discussed amongst other things, the Ganges issue. Following this meeting, there was a Joint Declaration on May 16, 1974, wherein they observed that during the periods of minimum flow in the Ganges, there might not be enough water and, therefore, the fair weather (dry season) flow of the Ganges in the lean months would have to be augmented to meet the needs of Calcutta port and to fulfill requirement of Bangladesh. They also agreed that the best means of augmentation through optimum utilization of the water resources of the region available to the two countries should be studied by the Joint Rivers Commission. The two sides expressed their determination that before the Farakka project is commissioned; they would arrive at a mutually acceptable allocation of the water available during the periods of minimum flow in the Ganges . The JRC accordingly took up the issue of augmentation of the Ganges flows but was unable to reach any agreement.

At a subsequent minister level meeting in April 1975 the Indian side proposed a test-run of the feeder canal of the Farakka Barrage for a limited period during that dry season. On good faith, Bangladesh agreed to India ’s request and allowed it to operate the feeder canal with varying discharges in ten-day periods from April 21 to May 31, 1975, ensuring the continuance of the remaining flows to Bangladesh . Although India was supposed to divert limited quantities of water from the Ganges for the said test-run up to May 31, 1975, it continued withdrawals from Farakka to the full capacity of the feeder canal during the dry season of 1976 without entering into any understanding or agreement on sharing the flows despite Bangladesh’s repeated requests. The consequences of India ’s actions had been tragic. The unilateral Indian withdrawals throughout the dry seasons of 1976 caused a marked reduction in the dry season Ganges flows in Bangladesh . This sudden change in the flow pattern caused an alarming situation in the south western region of Bangladesh .

To cut a long story short, Bangladesh repeatedly requested India to stop the unilateral withdrawals but this bore little fruit. Bangladesh then took the issue to the United Nations in 1976 and the General Assembly urged both sides to seek an immediate solution. Between 1977 and 1988 Bangladesh and India signed several temporary agreements but no permanent understanding could be reached. Between 1988 and 1996 there was no instrument for sharing the dry season Ganges flows between the two countries. In the absence of any agreement, India again started unilateral withdrawals from Farakka. It was not until the Awami League returned to power in 1996 in Bangladesh under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina (daughter of the slain leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) that a treaty between the countries was signed on the sharing of the Ganges Water at Farakka. This treaty has not been viewed favourably in Bangladesh as it was felt to be a subservient arrangement without the usual safeguards and guarantees and contrary to norms of international law. It appears these apprehensions were well founded as recent reports suggest that the quantity of water flowing down from the Farakka point has been declining due to the withdrawal of water by India through various canals in violation of the water sharing agreement.

The treaty is now under legal challenge in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh on the following grounds amongst others –

1. That Bangladesh has been receiving lesser amounts of flows at Farakka as its share compared to the quanta it should be receiving as agreed between the contracting parties set out in the schedule contained in Annexure II of the Treaty.
2. The instruments signed by Bangladesh and India do not provide entitlement to the former to participate or to become party to negotiations on any water course or in any consultations thereof e.g. Bangladesh cannot participate in the bilateral negotiation between India and Nepal which aim to implement projects on major tributaries of the Ganges river emanating from the Nepalese territory like the Pancheswar and Saptkosi High Dam Projects.
3. Over the last three decades the Bangladesh government has repeatedly requested India for upstream hydro-meteorological data of the Ganges , Brahamputra and other rivers. The Indian side has declined to supply or exchange such upstream data and information. The 1996 treaty and other Indo-Bangladesh agreements are totally silent about the provisioning of this information.
4. India either unilaterally or bilaterally with Nepal and Bhutan are undertaking planned measures for harnessing and regulating water resources of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, Meghna and some of their tributaries without informing or providing notification to the downstream riparian country of those rivers which is Bangladesh.
5. The 1996 Treaty and other Indo-Bangladesh do not provide for any third-party arbitration on settlement of disputes.

These are only a few of the grounds that are claimed by the petitioner to be in contravention of customary international law and in particular the provisions of the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and the Berlin Rules on Water Resources[ii] which both contain internationally accepted safeguards and guarantees that were omitted from the 1996 treaty. In particular, India’s withdrawal of waters in an unreasonable and inequitable manner and the terms of the 1996 treaty appear to be in violation of Articles 7,8,13,17,29,56,57,58,59,60,68,72 and 73 of the Berlin Rules but most importantly and significantly Article 12 which states –

1. Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the waters of an international drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner having due regard for the obligation not to cause significant harm to other basin States.

2. In particular, basin States shall develop and use the waters of the basin in order to attain the optimal and sustainable use thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of other basin States, consistent with adequate protection of the waters.

And Article 16 which provides –

Basin States, in managing the waters of an international drainage basin, shall refrain from and prevent acts or omissions within their territory that cause significant harm to another basin State having due regard for the right of each basin State to make equitable and reasonable use of the waters.

Regardless of the outcome of the case, relations between Bangladesh and India are likely to deteriorate as agreement on water sharing in an equitable and reasonable manner appear a distant and forlorn prospect making conflict a more likely scenario. In some respects, a low level conflict has already begun as there are frequent and bloody skirmishes between the two countries border security forces and occasionally fighting has occurred over construction of groins and spurs on the Indian side intended to divert the course of rivers so that they encroach further into Bangladesh territory while supplementing the Indian side.

RIVER LINKING PROJECT

If the Farakka Barrage dispute had been the only bone of contention between the two countries then some minimum resolution to the dispute may have been forthcoming but with India (in total disregard of the environmental harm that would be sustained by Bangladesh ) now undertaking the massive River Linking Project (RLP) a further serious deterioration in relations is inevitable. Quite astonishingly, the RLP concept was conceived not by an expert committee or by the relevant government department but instead by the Indian Supreme Court which ruled (in relation to a Public Interest Litigation hearing) that there should be interlinking of rivers to offset drought and flooding in various parts of the country. Justice Kirpal set a 10 year deadline for implementation of the project. A brief six-page order passed on October 31, 2002 formed the basis on which the Indian government set up a high powered task force which devised a Perspective Plan comprising two components -

1. Peninsular Rivers Development; and

2. Himalayan Rivers Development

The Peninsular Rivers Component envisages the inter-linking of several major rivers at several different points along their course. The Himalayan Rivers Component which poses more serious difficulties for Bangladesh envisages construction of storages on the principal tributaries of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra in India , Nepal and Bhutan . Also, canal systems are to be inter-linked to transfer surplus flows of the eastern tributaries of the Ganges to the West apart from linking the (main) Brahmaputra and its tributaries with the Ganges and the Ganges with Mahanadi .

The effect of the RLP on Bangladesh has been variously described as devastating, catastrophic and also causing incalculable and irreparable damage to the country’s environment and ecological balance. This unfortunately is not mere exaggeration since the Brahmaputra and the Ganges provides more than 85% of the total surface water available in Bangladesh during the dry season. Of the two, the Brahmaputra provides 67% of the water. The diversion and withdrawal of these waters under the RLP would constitute a similar proposition to Bangladesh as the Iraqi WMD program did (under the Saddam Hussain regime) for the United States and the United Kingdom . In the present context the threat to Bangladesh is not hypothetical.

In the face of this looming crisis the Government of Bangladesh has already lodged protests to the Government of India expressing serious concern over the RLP and has urged India to refrain from implementation of the plan. The Government has also communicated Bangladesh ’s serious concern over the Indian plan to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank and requested them to desist from providing any support to India relating to this plan. The matter was also raised during several meetings of the JRC where India was urged to desist from such a move without the consent of Bangladesh . It appears, however, that the Indian political leadership is committed to go ahead with this plan at the cost of its neighbours. The feeling is intensifying in the minds of the general public in Bangladesh against the Indian plan and their voice of protest is growing louder with the passage of time.

Considering that the Farraka Barrage and the RLP are only two of the many projects being undertaken by the Indian Government to divert and withdraw waters from the common rivers indicates that water sharing disputes with Bangladesh will progressively increase and naturally lead to growing tensions between the countries. The other major disputes on water sharing now include the Teesta, Feni, Meghna, Mahananda, Monu, Khowai, Gumti, Muhuri and Kodla Rivers and also construction of the Tipaimukh Dam in Manipur district of India. This last mentioned project has had the effect of eroding a large portion of Sylhet district in Bangladesh with almost 5000 acres drifting towards the Indian side following erosion of the riverbanks due to an artificial change in the course of the rivers Surma and Kushiara. All these water sharing disputes and the continued disregard for the concerns expressed by Bangladesh about these projects and the continuation of diversion and withdrawal of water in an unreasonable and inequitable manner is being viewed as an attack on the sovereignty of the country which if not restrained and outstanding issues settled amicably could lead to conflict in the coming decades.

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