Untold Facts

India Challenges Pakistan, on New Turfs

Last week witnessed profound changes to the complex and delicate South Asian strategic calculus, which despite the diplomatic niceties being exchanged between the foreign secretaries of New Delhi and Islamabad, clearly reflect the alarming direction of Indian strategic ambitions and warrant a thoughtful and thorough review of Pakistan’s national security doctrine.

Firstly, in an unprecedented high-level effort to discover a common ground in Afghanistan with Saudi Arabia, Manmohan Singh paid a historic visit to Saudi Arabia and in return for isolating Pakistan in the hectic multi-lateral diplomatic efforts currently afoot, offered Riyadh large-scale Indian investment and oil contracts. Commenting audaciously on the first visit by an Indian prime minister to the Saudi Kingdom in 28 years, Shashi Tharoor, the Indian Minister of State for External affairs, publicly suggested that India should ask Saudi Arabia to pressurise Pakistan regarding its Afghan policy.

Secondly, despite both overt and covert US prodding, the recent foreign secretary level Indo-Pak talks yielded only an unequivocal Indian refusal to restart the stalled composite dialogue and were conspicuous by the absence of both desire and effort on either side to go beyond reiteration of their historical positions.

In addition, already the fourth largest military spender in the world, India raised its defence budget to an unprecedented level of 32 billion dollars, within a day of Pakistani Foreign Secretary’s criticism of Indian ambitious military modernisation programme as a threat to the stability of a ‘nuclearized South Asia’.

Whilst the Indian Foreign Secretary was entertaining the Pakistani delegation at the Hyderabad House, the Indian Air Force was busy conducting a massive firepower demonstration (FPD) ahead of the ‘Vayu Shakti-2010′ at the Chandan Air-to-Air Range at Pokhran in Rajasthan, only miles away from the Pak-India border. One wonders if the Indo-Pak peace talks are anything to go by, who are these large-scale military deployments and exercises, held so close to the Pakistani border, aimed at.

From the Pakistani perspective, a very interesting and significant component of these Indian Air Force exercises were the IAF’s Special Forces Para-drop operations, aimed at neutralising a terrorist camp inside enemy territory, watched by no less than 30 defence attaches of different countries, minus of course Pakistan and China. Other targets included mock radar sites, tanks, marshalling yards, terrorist camps, runways, infantry fighting vehicles, blast pens and convoys.

This high-tech exercise constitutes day and night operations of the IAF frontline fighters, such as the Su-30 MK1, Mirage-2000, Jaguar, Mig-29 and Mig-21; the transport aircraft include AN-32, Embraer and IL-76, while Mi-17 and Mi-35 attack helicopters represent the rotary wing ingredient. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is also deployed to monitor these exercises and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) provide a live stream of video images of the target identification, engagement and destruction.

During his recent Indian visit, the Pakistani foreign secretary wisely took the opportunity to warn India that “New war doctrines, a tremendous boost to defence spending and the induction of new sophisticated weapons systems, are prejudicial to regional security and stability.” However, the world also needs to realise that Indian defence policy and mammoth military spending, do not add up with peaceful objectives and betray the ambitions of a regional hegemony, which is determined to waste the wealth of its poor majority not on their welfare but towards browbeating its smaller neighbours. Meanwhile, New Delhi is also forging close strategic ties with Washington and Riyadh, two of Islamabad’s vital allies, apparently at Pakistan’s expense.

It seems that in the absence of a clear threat or provocation from any neighbouring state, Indian coercive diplomatic posturing, aggressive doctrinal orientation and large scale conventional and strategic military muscle flexing will force Pakistan to depart from its policy of ‘minimum credible deterrence’ towards developing a robust second strike capability, in the form of an elaborate triad of nuclear delivery systems, to foreclose all Indian conventional and strategic options. Moreover, Islamabad should use the forums of UN and SCO to consolidate its diplomatic position over Afghanistan. Pakistan desires a peaceful neighbourhood but if India understands only the language of power politics, then so be it. In the interest of regional peace and security, Pakistan must and will make it understand just that.

Author: Syed Muhammad Ali

Afghanistan: The Marjah operations

Marjah is a part of Nad Ali district in Helmand province, Afghanistan. It has 80,000 population and the district headquarter of Nad Ali is situated in Marjah town. Though it is not the main stronghold of the Taliban, it should be noted that its proximity to the Iranian and the Pakistani borders of Baluchistan is intriguing.

So, its location was a factor of consideration when chosen by the US and coalition forces for military operations rather than Washer and Baghiran areas in Helmand province, which are also under control of the Taliban.

Earlier on January 30 this year, Eikenberry, US ambassador to Afghanistan, told reporters that the US and the NATO troops would launch massive operations in Helmand and Kandahar simultaneously, but they chose only Marjah.

Since last Saturday, February 13, 2010, when the operations began, 120 Taliban militants are reported to have been killed, according to the Afghan government and coalition forces. The Taliban, however, do not confirm the accounts. Instead, they claim to have killed more than 25 foreign troops and have downed two predator planes.

Similarly, many civilians have lost their lives in missiles and mortar atacks by coalition forces. Spokespersons of foreign troops put their casualties at 11 soldiers and still counting.

According to media reports, 60 helicopters are taking part in the operation beside 15,000 troops, including the mighty IED-busting 65-ton Trojan tank called The “Swiss Army Knife.” It is built to cut through the harshest of terrains with its monster tool kit

On the basis of human rights organizations, more than 10,000 families have fled Marjah to take refuge in Khash Rod district of neighboring Nimroz province and other parts of Helmand.

According to General Sher Mohammad Zazi, commander of the joint operations, 500-600 Taliban are puting up resistance in Marjah. But, Taliban sources say their number is 1,000 militants. Many of the Taliban groups from northern and southern provinces of Afghanistan have joined them and are now fighting with them.

The Taliban claim that they are still in control of Marjah and put invitation on their website, calling on independent media outlets to visit Marjah to verify that they are still in control. On the first day of the operations, the coalition forces had a spectacular advancement, taking Marjah district headquarter and city markets, but on the following day, the advancement slowed down. Small mobile teams of the armed Taliban and their suicide bombers bounced back, encircling the area.

Now, they repeatedly atack US and Afghan troops with rockets, snipers, and rocket-propelled grenade besides ambushing columns of mine-clearing vehicles, close to the main road of Marjah.

British major general Nick Carter told reporters at the Pentagon via satellite that it would take one month to clear Marjah and 3 months to judge whether the operations were successful or not He said the coalition was facing “stiff resistance” from Taliban small groups.

According to the Afghan government, two thousand police men from the Afghan National Police (ANP) will remain in Marjah to ensure that the Taliban do not return and will start reconstruction work.

But the UN announcing (that they will not participate in the reconstruction in Marjah when the operations are over) came as a hard blow to the Pentagon efforts to win hearts and minds of the local people.

After the London conference on January 28, a trust fund was established with 140 million pledges from donor countries to initiate reintegration and reconciliation with the Taliban.

Germany also allocated EUR 20 million for reconciliation in the country, but the Taliban’s leadership council rejected the offer by issuing a statement:

“The defeated invaders should know that their ploys and wiles would not have any achievement to deceive the freedom-loving people of Afghanistan. The invaders have no option but to put an end to the occupation of our country and soil.”

Instead, the Taliban called on Americans to release Taliban prisoners and remove their names from the UN blacklist as a first step for reconciliation.

Washington believes that Marjah operations are necessary to put pressure on the Taliban to come to the table of negotiation and to boost the American position in negotiations.

Some observers believe that the US wants to install some surveillance equipment in Marjah to monitor Iran’s uranium enrichment program. After the failure of the recent efforts by Washington to dissuade Tehran from following its uranium enrichment program, the White House is considering a new package of restrictions on Iran.

So, Washington wants, on the one hand, to put pressure on the Taliban to accept reconciliation on the government terms and, on the other hand, would like to tighten the noose around Tehran by stationing its forces closer to the Iranian border.

On February 1 this year, Afghan president Karzai met King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to request help in bringing the Taliban to dialogue. He also called on the Pakistani government to play their role as mediators between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

On the other hand, Washington now has adopted a two-pronged process: reintegration and reconciliation. By reintegration, they mean to lure away Taliban ranks by giving them cash incentives, job opportunities, and retirement bonuses. By reconciliation, they mean to start dialogue with the leadership of the Taliban.

However, the Afghan government and foreign countries, which have military presence in Afghanistan, have not agreed on a unanimous strategy for reconciliation with the Taliban.

Even, in the Kabul government, some members of the northern alliance whom hold top government positions consider Taliban as their real enemy and not Al-Qaeda. They do not want them to have a share in the government Hence, they are one of the main hurdles in the way of the negotiation with the Taliban.

Earlier, the Afghan government had nominated Arif Noorzai, former minister of tribal affairs of the Karzai cabinet, to conduct negotiation with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan, but had no pragmatic results because without the participation of the Taliban, talks with Hekmatyar will not pay off, even if an agreement is reached.

The reconciliation process should be Afghanized. The Kabul government should be empowered to take independent decision regarding reconciliation. He further says, the US, EU, and the Kabul government should work out a unanimous strategy. This will create an atmosphere of confidence for reconciliation talks to take place.

Since 2001, American and British forces have launched 15 operations in Helmand province. Previously, the Taliban were fighting like a regular army, which caused them huge casualties because of the US and the NATO aerial bombardment But, now, they have turned to guerilla tactics and are organized in small mobile decentralized groups, which ambush coalition forces repeatedly.

With this tactic, the Taliban would be able to extend the Marjah operations until next spring. Other Taliban militants from Afghan provinces, who join the Taliban groups in Marjah from time to time, will keep the momentum high enough to engage the American and British troops there.

Finally, the “together” operations will go into oblivion, like operations Khanjar (Strike of the Sword) and the Panther’s Claw launched in Helmand province in July last year.

As to reconciliation, without a unanimous strategy and confidence-building measures, the reconciliation talks will not proceed. So, before any talks to begin, both sides should create conducive atmosphere of trust and confidence. Then, they can proceed to second phase, which is negotiation for peace.

Author: Suhail Shaheen
(Source IslamOnline. Thewriter in a Former Chief Editor of the Kabul Times)

Salman Bashir’s Kashmir Talk: A Point of Concern

(Foreign Secretary Slaman Bashir, unlike his political bosses, was articulate and professional in his performance before the Press in Delhi. But the important issue is: did he have a brief that departs from the stand of Kashmiris and Pakistanis who view the issue as one of ‘right of self-determination’ not of human rights or any other vague peripheral rights. I am glad that the Kashmiris noticed and are resolute not to allow Pakistan to compromise their right of self-determination. + Usman Khalid +)

Mr Salman Bashir, Foreign Secretary, Government of Pakistan held a press conference in New Delhi at the conclusion of foreign secretary level meeting held between India and Pakistan on 25/02/2010. A little earlier, his Indian counter part, Nirupama Rao also addressed the press, saying we talked about Kashmir but very briefly. Salman Bashir (henceforth SB), later said he disagrees with that, and that Kashmir was discussed at length. We are not going to analyze the results of this secretary level meeting, nor make any judgments about its success or otherwise, the purpose of this brief write-up is to seek the attention of readers towards what seemed to me a sort of contradiction or incoherence in SB’s press briefing. It was not an explicit contradiction, certainly not a contradiction between his utterances, and, therefore, was not easily notable. However, some contradiction, incoherence or inconsistency, whatever you may choose to call it, did definitely exist. It was subtle, and so, to my mind, very serious. This is what I call a point of concern, and its meaning will become clear as we move on.

It should be noted at the outset, that SB’s performance at the press meet was absolutely professional, and highly impressive. He understood very well what he was being asked and answered most appropriately. Particularly to a question from an Indian journalist asking him why Pakistan was not moving bulk of its forces from eastern border to the western given the fact that Pakistan’s military was now actively engaged on that front, SB gave a reply which to my understanding could not have been more precise, meaningful, polished and diplomatic. (It might be well worth one’s time and effort to look for the transcript of this press briefing for a better appreciation of what I am saying).

This was not a policy statement, so we will not look at it in terms of Pakistan’s official position on Kashmir, our interest is more profound, and concerns much deeper and wider. It is in that sense that we believe President’s speech deserves to be put in the perspective, and accordingly appreciated. By saying what has been mentioned above, the President has caught the bull by horn, and has very succinctly captured the essence of Pakistan’s commitment to Kashmir.

Now coming to the contradiction referred to above, let us note that whatever SB spoke at the press meet was precisely measured, targeted at an audience with a purpose, as all such press briefings typically are, and his choice of words was very careful. He talked about so many things, and while we can analyze each and every bit separately, we can treat the whole press briefing as one single event aimed at conveying a message, articulating a position, a stand. After all that is the essence of such events. It was heartening to see, and was absolutely clear that the message given out by SB’s press conference was one of Pakistan’s defiance in face of India’s bullying. Pakistan was standing its ground, ready to talk about anything as an equal sovereign interlocutor of India. This is what cumulatively was the impact of all that SB said. So far so good, but it is here that one can start looking for the inconsistency I am talking about. As is clear, for this press briefing to have created a single effect, it was absolutely necessary that all the individual utterances of SB should have been in full harmony with each other, which by and large was the case. However, two elements did not seem to cohere with each other, with one of these elements violating the overall spirit of the briefing. Both the points are about Kashmir. Let us briefly explain this now.

First Element: SB made it absolutely clear that Kashmir is the core issue between India and Pakistan, and has been so for the past 62 years. He almost repeated it in different contexts, and in response to different questions, he firmly stood his ground. Now, this was one of the two elements, and it was in complete harmony with the spirit of the briefing.

Second Element: What was the other element? It was what SB said regarding the situation in occupied Kashmir, and Pakistan’s support to the people there who he said were fighting for their ‘rights’. SB stopped short of saying, and that is the crux of the whole matter, ‘right of self-determination’. He deliberately chose, as one would tend to believe, the word ‘rights’ instead of the much used, and, therefore, familiar phrase ‘right of self-determination’. He further elaborated it by saying that people should have the right of free movement from one part of Kashmir to another.

The Contradiction: One could justifiably construe this as Pakistan’s climb down from its standard position on Kashmir, but that contradicts the overall spirit of SB’s press interaction. Sending a message of defiance, as SB’s press meet sought to do, effectively articulates Pakistan’s standard position on Kashmir. After all, Kashmir is the barometer where one can read the relative positions of Pakistan and India vis-à-vis each other. So one cannot say this signifies a departure, but certainly, it creates a problem, does not harmonise with the message SB was giving to his hosts and the world at large. That is why I prefer to call it contradiction rather than departure. If the question is simply of the rights, why should Pakistan talk about it? Does Pakistan talk about the rights of the deprived millions in India for whom the Nexalite, Maoist, and Dalit movements claim to be speaking? It defies logic: If Kashmir is the core issue between India and Pakistan, what is the issue there? Fortunately, there is not much room for ‘creativity’ here, as SB himself said, and absolutely rightly, one cannot be dismissive about this issue. This is the title page of the recent post-British south Asian history. Talk of Pakistan, Kashmir will come up, talk of India, you are talking of Kashmir. The point I want to make here is that when Pakistan talks to India about Kashmir (regardless of whether the word ‘core issue’ is mentioned or not), the clock gets automatically reset to 1947, everything becomes manifest, the fact and reality of the Kashmir issue shows up in a crystal clear way, no party or state versions, but the issue as it factually is, becomes absolutely clear. When SB talked about Kashmir as the main issue standing in the way of normalisation of ties between India and Pakistan, he might have uttered a few words, but it meant volumes to any one in his normal senses, whether a genius, a rocket-scientist or not.

It harmonises with the rest of what he said, and creates one single effect. But when he asks his hosts that Kashmiri people should be given their ‘rights’, and includes the right of free travel between two Kashmirs in that, he is indirectly defining the issue, and bringing it to a level where it defies common sense why it should be an issue so central to Indo-Pak relations. Actually, one fails to understand then, why there should be any discord in the first place at all. The discord arises only when Pakistan insists on sovereign equality, a claim that is integrally bound to its position on Kashmir, and cannot sustain if that position is given up. SB’s talk of sovereign equality at the press briefing and an overall position of defiance cannot go hand in hand with his reference to the struggle in Kashmir as a struggle for ‘rights’. The message of defiance or firmness, as SB’s press meet sought to gave, would then lack credibility and also meaning. Not that it will mean any bad thing like surrender, climb down, etc. etc.; it will not mean anything at all.

***

Author: Dr. Syed M Inayatullah Andrabi
From: Occupied Kashmir

The misery on our faces

We were Muslims in 1947; we are Muslims now. There is a difference, however. Today we wear our religion on our sleeves and shout it from the housetops.

Times may be hard but why add to the sum of national misery? Some of our afflictions, like the economic downturn and the war raging along the Afghan frontier, may be beyond anyone’s control. But some are entirely self-created.

We are not a police state in the political sense of the term. This is not a country behind any kind of iron curtain and, the notoriety of our intelligence services notwithstanding, we do not have anything like the East German Stasi prying into every aspect of national life. We have one of the freest media in the Islamic world. Our kind of talk shows would not be permitted in most Muslim countries.
While we should count our blessings we should not forget that in the social sense this is a very repressed society.

The pity of it is that it wasn’t always like this. Once upon a time mosque and tavern stood side by side (in a metaphorical sense of course) and even as they did, no one said Islam was in danger. How distant that time seems.

We were Muslims in 1947; we are Muslims now. There is a difference, however. Today we wear our religion on our sleeves and shout it from the housetops.

Protesting too much about anything betrays a sense of insecurity. An honest man, not given to self-righteousness, feels no necessity to proclaim his honesty. An honest woman, normally, does not protest her virtue — unless there be the memory of a past sitting uneasily on her conscience.
Just as Italy will always be Catholic, and just as there will always be a Pope in the Vatican, we will be Muslims until the end of time. This is our destiny, something that we were born into. So what is there to be so worked up about? Hinduism stood in danger at the hands of Islam. Islam in the sub-continent was never threatened by Hinduism.

But if someone were to read our Constitution, with its repetitive references to Islam, or if someone were to read our court judgments wherein our learned judges are hard put not to deliver extended lectures on Islam, or if someone were to hear political speeches being delivered at public meeting where references to the faith are virtually endless, he/she would come away convinced that here was a people in perpetual fear of something dreadful happening to their faith.

The problems we were called upon to solve at our birth were political and economic in nature: temporal problems, secular problems, not problems of the hereafter. We solved some, failed to solve others. But every time we ran into difficulties, we retreated into the bosom of extraneous issues, seeking comfort under the banner of Islam. This has been an extreme form of national escapism.
Soon after independence we should have been able to frame a constitution. But our attempts at constitution-making were sidetracked by a never-ending debate about the role of Islam in our collective life. It was amidst the cacophony of this debate that Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan moved the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly.

What is this Resolution? Read it and it is hard to escape the impression that it is a tribute to needless rhetoric. Many years later, Gen Ziaul Haq, not famous as a respecter of constitutions, made the Resolution a substantive part of the 1973 Constitution, his move another Islamisation gimmick at which he was so good. Since Zia, many parliaments have come and gone. None thought it fit to do away with his constitutional innovations.

The people of East Pakistan were as good or bad Muslims as we in the West. They had issues with us regarding language, the sharing of political power, the distribution of national resources. Not being able to address those issues we discovered to our cost in 1970-71 that religion alone was not enough of a force to keep the country together. Just as we are discovering today that religion alone is irrelevant to the grievances of Balochistan.

Today we present the picture not of a house divided — which would be too harsh an indictment — but of a fractured society. The share of other faiths in our population is miniscule. We are an overwhelmingly Muslim country. But if we are still a fractured society, this should give us pause to think whether our problems are related to religion or other things.

If our cities are unclean we need better municipal services. Islamabad is dotted with mosques, large and small, which is a very good thing because at least it shows that while we may not be serious about other things, eternity figures high in the list of our preoccupations. But how does it help to have a capital which even after 50 years of its founding does not have an adequate system of solid waste disposal?

Islamabad should have been a model city in more senses than one. The city should have meandered around the many clear water springs flowing down from the Margalla Hills. Today there is not one which is not a monument to pollution. There are schools in this capital city for the rich and poor. At least here we could have experimented with a uniform education system. One can go on and on about Islamabad but that’s not the point of this journey.

The problems of Pakistan will not be fixed overnight. My generation can now write its epitaph. It has failed this country by not providing the leadership and direction needed. We could not set out on the golden road to Samarkand. We lacked the imagination for it and no doubt the vigour of action. But we are not unique on the planet. Every place has its problems, in many cases worse than ours. We stand alone in making our problems worse by shackling ourselves in fetters we could have done without.
We don’t look a happy people. Other things may abound in the Islamic Republic but not the spirit of joy. There are people who celebrate life. There are people who carry a cross all the time and mourn about life. We fall in the second category. Partly through choice, partly through the sheer force of circumstances, we have elected to become a killjoy society.

This is not what we deserve. People laugh and cry. Tragedy triggers sorrow. But that is not the whole truth. When the shadows of tragedy depart people still have a yearning for some fun. This is part of our inheritance as human beings, an inalienable aspect of the human condition. But since the Islamic Republic, and what we have made of it, frowns upon the outward expression of joy, things to do with joy and happiness have been driven indoors.

The veil in Pakistan is not just an item of female clothing. It is also the cover behind which lurks social hypocrisy: outward piety masking inward licence. But inward licence only for the rich. Since the many dimensions of happiness are forbidden fruit in the broad spaces of the Republic, small wonder if the price of sin has become prohibitive.

Hypocrisy as a national characteristic, an all-pervading phenomenon, is not a good thing. It makes a people sick and stunted. It makes them less free. Isn’t it time the veil was rent asunder?

That parliament could cleanse the Constitution and return it to the form in which it existed on the eve of Zia’s coup is hoping for too much. There is nothing in parliament to indicate the audacity required for such a leap. But appealing to the god of lesser things, why can’t we do away with the Hadood Ordinance, one of Zia’s most poisonous gifts at the altar of hypocrisy. Many of our social shackles derive their strength from this iniquitous legislation. What allows the police to smell breaths and ask for marriage papers is this ordinance. Scrapping it would allow the people of Pakistan to breathe more freely. The frontiers of the social police state would contract.

Forget about universal solutions. Forget about appeals to revolutionary arms. This won’t happen. In the season of our discontent if only two small miracles can happen — getting rid of the plastic shopping bag, more of a long-term threat than the Taliban, and the Hadood Ordinance — Pakistan will look a cleaner and healthier place. Along with the social police state, the frontiers of morbidity will also contract.

Author: Ayaz Amir
Ayaz Amir is a distinguished Pakistani commentator and Member of National Assembly (parliament).

Challenges to Deterrence in South Asia -A credible Balance of Terror also implies a balance within the elements of national power

Deterrence is a subject studied feverishly in all academic and policy making forums of South Asia. Yet there remains a visible deficit in comprehension and practice of the concept. Few realise that the only tangible case in which deterrence as a stand alone worked was the Korean War; not against the Chinese or North Koreans, but against the strategic thought of US Military Command, when General Douglas McArthur wanted to bomb Manchurian corridor. It was then that nuclear strategist from both sides of the Atlantic got together and rediscovered Clausewitz and the adage that ‘War is too serious a matter to be left in the hands of Generals’. At the extreme end of coercive diplomacy, it was now possible for civilian statesmen to bypass the entire military instrument. Leaders in South Asia choose to ignore this lesson.

Nuclear Absolutism aside, nuclear armed political leaders of South Asia need to realise that solutions to disputes is not in threat or use of violence but rather, in purposeful negotiations. Just like the ultimate objective of any war is peace (Clausewitz), nuclear deterrence averts war and seeks peace (Brodie). If they do not, they could run out of stamina like USSR disintegrating under the weight of its own empire.

Having acquired much of our knowledge on nuclear strategy from Western and American writers, both Pakistan and India have nose-dived into the semantics and simplifications. Military commanders particularly ignore the fact that deterrence in practice and reality is a psychological notion to avert and not fight a war of any description. In simplest terms, it remains a balance of terror wherein equalisation of capabilities brings with it the equalisation of vulnerabilities; simply put: Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). If they continue to see them as super bombs, there is always a danger that such notions develop innate tendencies to drift towards a war fighting mindset under a nuclear shadow; a dangerous proposition already put to effect.

To support my argument, we have lessons from history. Nuclear Utilisation Theorists (NUTs) from all blocks toyed with the ideas of limited war, proxy wars, peripheral conflicts and political economy. This kept alive the concept of a super bomb through Flexible Response and Graduated Deterrence. However, the entire nuclear jargon failed to even maintain a status quo. USSR and Eastern Europe disintegrated through domestic political economy, least to mention any grand design of the West. In the ultimate analysis, it was the social and emotive dimension triggered by socio-economic conditions that brought an end to the Cold War.

The biggest danger in South Asia is that both India and Pakistan have chosen the Cold War Template for nuclear thinking. Each day, we see a clear drift from a Mutual Deterrence to the advent of NUTs. This was predictable even before India went nuclear in 1974 and Pakistan in 1998. Unlike the Cold War Theatre separated by the European and APEC landmasses, South Asia had a live Line of Control with a legitimate ongoing freedom struggle in Kashmir. It was inevitable that both countries would ultimately toy with the ideas of limited conflicts despite being nuclear.

Pakistan challenged its own thesis of Nuclear Stability by initiating Kargil despite international isolation. India seems to follow suit through the concepts of Limited War under a Nuclear Shadow and Cold Start Doctrine. However, within the premise of this escalation, the capability of either side to strike, survive and strike again is both progressive and retrogressive. Hypothetically, in nuclear calculus, the adversary with more striking and surviving capability is the ultimate winner. We hear of threshold theories manifesting a willingness to fight a conventional conflict short of a nuclear flash point and hence a constant urge to strike a balance resulting in an expensive conventional and unconventional arms race that hurts Pakistan. India feels assured that it could escalate the conflict to a higher level while international intervention would prevent use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan.

India appears to follow this logic by boosting its missile defence and surveillance capability with active assistance from Russia, Israel and USA. Indo-US Nuclear cooperation also provides a Nuclear Umbrella of sorts. India also stands taller on the survivability ladder due to Nuclear Powered Submarines, military bases in Nicobar and Andaman and very high altitude strategic bombers (Russia) beyond the range of Pakistan’s air defence capability. This advantage compensates its limited and suspect capability of employing fusion devices. India is also tempted to challenge the status quo and attempt a rot through covert peripheral conflicts against Pakistan through Afghanistan, manipulation of agriculture water and projection of Pakistan as a discredited failing state.

In contrast, the balance between Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and defence unlike India is primarily indigenous. It maintains the balance of terror more through its striking, rather than its defensive capability. In face of an unequal relationship it is but logical for Pakistan to challenge the status quo through an in extremis conventional/unconventional militarism on the periphery. This explains Indian sensitivity to the attack on Taj Mahal Hotel in Bombay though the trails suggest an international operation planned by individuals residing in USA.

Analytically, Pakistan’s nuclear threshold has been driven down not so much by experimentation with low-intensity warfare in Kashmir as by nearly twenty years of starkly unequal arms acquisition trends, and by India’s readiness to exploit its huge build up through Coercive and Compellence Diplomacy in tandem with USA and UK. Pakistan’s asymmetry in surveillance, residual capability and defensive shield has widened. Pakistan is being led into a nuclear and conventional arms race with no choice but a massive first use against any conventional attack. Driven into the corner, Pakistan would have the flair to do just that. However, even this minimum means diversion of major national assets towards security at the cost of national development. Hence a credible Balance of Terror also implies a balance within the elements of national power.

Technically, Pakistan’s strike nuclear forces appear more than equal and in some aspects ahead of India. However, Pakistan’s major problems in political instability, poor governance, institutionalised corruption, militancy, bad economic policies and fragmentation of society make it vulnerable to collapsing under its own weight. It is this phenomena rather than India that remains the biggest threat to the stability of nuclear capability in Pakistan.

Despite major military successes, Pakistan remains at the loosing end of this war of attrition. Other than the endemic Indian and American media scoops, some Pakistani media persons have also joined to discredit patriotic Pakistani journalists and analysts who see the game through and through.

It is in this backdrop that Pakistan will have to conduct its secretary level diplomacy in India and assure the suspect international audience that everything is safe. India is in no mood to negotiate peace.

Pakistan’s gradual surrender to compellence imposed by Indo-US pressures reflects a fragile and self centered bunkered national leadership. This alone remains the most serious aspersion on the will and determination needed to handle a credible deterrence regime. It goes to the character of this nation that despite total lack of national leadership, the people brave the odds and hold their heads high.

Author: Brigadier (retd) Samson Simon Sharaf
(The writer a retired officer of Pakistan Army and a Political Economist)

Plight of Muslims under terrorism

(The waging of ‘War on Terror’ on Muslims by the sole super power – the USA – have given its strategic partners - India and Israel – to kill, humiliate and dispossess the Muslim population under their control with the US public eying it with approval. Thus the USA is seen an accomplice in the murders and mayhem that goes on in Israel and India. +Usman Khalid +)

Never before was the situation for the Muslims in India so awful as today. An accused in terror attack in Mumbai 26/11 Fahim Ansari wants bail to come out and search a lawyer who can defend him. Reason: his lawyer Shahid Azmi has been shot dead by Chhota Rajan gang in the name of “patriotic killing.” His move suggests that he accepts the judicial system. Despite its shortcoming he still trusts it to exonerate him ultimately. Azmi himself had gone through the rigmaroles of the judicial system and had successfully overcome hurdles including five years in jail when he completed junior college education and graduation. He knew that the system was biased against the minority and yet he did not lose faith in the institutions of the country. They redeemed him only to be killed as he was fighting for many others like him who were incarcerated. The Sachar commission has already documented that the highest number of inmates everywhere in the country is of Muslims.

Another accused is Saquib Nachan booked for local train blast at Mulund 2003. He has petitioned the SC to investigate all the cases of terrorism since 2002. There is something terribly wrong with conduct of investigation and the judicial system. According to him the Muslim youths are languishing in prisons across the country without trial. He has spent seven years in prison and others have also gone through the same length of time and even more.

The suffering of Nachan and Ansari or the late Azmi must also be viewed as an off shoot of the global strategy of Americans in the region. The gravitational pull that India and Pakistan exercise over the Americans is reflected in local bomb blasts in India.

Of late President Obama has authorized operation Af-Pak; and Marjah in Afghanistan has been baptized in fire. The fall out of this can and does affect situation in India. Muslims as a community in India are unconnected to the war on terror either in Afghanistan or Pakistan or even in Kashmir valley. The Af-Pak strategy and the Pakistan’s strategic depth into Afghanistan primarily bring the US into the subcontinent. Every drone attack or ground advance beyond the Khayber pass means more bomb attacks in Pakistan and its spill over into India.

If Pune blast is a consequence of this it proves foreign secretary Nirupama Rao right because she had pointed out at the possibility. “We have to be constantly alert to this possibility.” However if we have not got the clues and found any lead in the matter, it would give away our weakness in the investigation of the matter. In a hurry, as it often happens, to show some breakthrough to the bosses or to affiliates in ideology, it is also possible that more people like Ansari or Nachan would be made to wear the cross like some of the accused in Malegaon blast of 2006 whose only “crime” was to carry placards depicting Laden and denouncing the unjust war of George Bush on Iraq. The entry of terrorism thanks to America has destroyed what Alexander Pope rejoiced, happy the man whose wish and care a few paternal acres bind, content to breathe his native air in his native town.

Author: Mustafa Khan
Malegaon, Maharashtra

India’s belated turnaround

The Indian proposal to Pakistan for open-ended talks at the level of foreign secretaries to discuss all outstanding issues is a belated admission by New Delhi that its refusal to engage in a dialogue with Pakistan more than a year after Mumbai has been hurting Indian interests more than it is harming Pakistan’s. Reflecting this recognition, Indian officials have uncharacteristically been quite civilised in their language and tone towards Pakistan recently, and especially since the proposal was made.

India has so far shown reluctance to agree to the Pakistani proposal that the old format of “composite dialogue” should be revived, but the last word has not yet been said. When the two foreign secretaries get together later this month, the major task before them will be to prepare the ground for a meeting between their prime ministers at the sidelines of the SAARC Summit in the Bhutanese capital of Thimphu on April 26 and 27. If things go according to plan, a formal resumption of bilateral dialogue will be announced at this summit.

Manmohan Singh’s willingness, if not keenness, to start the dialogue process with Pakistan was evident also at the Sharm el-Shaikh Summit last July, at which he agreed to de-link the issue of talks from that of terrorism. But Manmohan Singh was made to backtrack by the unexpectedly strong backlash which came not only from the opposition BJP but also from within his own party and the Indian foreign policy and security establishments.

More than half a year since then, the Manmohan Singh government has now launched another diplomatic initiative to resume dialogue with Pakistan. He has a difficult balancing act to perform. He has to convince Pakistan that the talks will be not only about terrorism but will cover other issues of interest to it, while assuring domestic public opinion that the focus will be on terrorism and that progress on other issues would be linked to action by Pakistan on punishing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack.

According to Prime Minister Gilani, India has been forced to the negotiating table because of world pressure. This is a mistaken view. True, Washington has been urging Delhi to relieve pressure on Pakistan’s eastern borders to enable the Pakistani army to concentrate more on the fight against terrorists on its western borders. But Delhi’s readiness to resume talks, despite its unhappiness over what it sees as lack of action by Pakistan against terrorists who seek to target India, is founded in India’s own calculation that its wider interests and goals are better served by restarting a dialogue with Pakistan. There are several reasons for this.

First, India recognises that its “coercive diplomacy” towards Pakistan has failed. In 2004, when India last resumed talks after a terrorism-related suspension, it extracted a price: a commitment from Musharraf that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. This time, India initially demanded a bigger price: a dismantling of the “infrastructure of terrorism.” Since then, India has been scaling down its demand. On Feb 3 Foreign Minister S M Krishna said that Pakistan’s readiness to accept Ajmal Kasab’s confessional statement as evidence to prosecute the planners of Mumbai was a constructive signal and that India “should be quite satisfied with Pakistan taking a few steps to investigate the Mumbai attacks.” This is a far cry from the demand made in 2008 by M K Narayanan, then India’s national security adviser, for “destroying” the ISI.

Second, India has been rattled by the recent US readiness to take the Taliban on board in an eventual Afghanistan settlement and by Karzai’s offer to hold talks with their top leaders. India was virtually alone in opposing the endorsement given by the London Conference to the plan to win over the Taliban. Besides, there is the emerging recognition by the international community that Pakistani concerns about Indian domination of Afghanistan are not without foundation and will have to be taken into account.

Delhi’s fear is that it would be marginalised if a peace process which eventually gives the Taliban a share of the power were to take hold. One of India’s great strategic minds has now even proposed that Manmohan Singh should invite Karzai and Zardari for a trilateral summit on Afghanistan.

Third, India is keen to enter into talks with the “moderate” faction of the APHC on the grant of autonomy to Kashmir. But since Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who heads this faction, lacks broad support within Kashmir for such a deal, he is reluctant to take the political risk of negotiating with Delhi without at least the tacit understanding of Pakistan that Musharraf was prepared to give him.

India would also like autonomy talks with “moderate” Kashmiri leaders to proceed in parallel with backchannel talks with Pakistan on a “non-territorial” settlement of Kashmir which were initiated under Musharraf. The deal he was negotiating with Manmohan Singh would have sanctified the division of Kashmir along the Line of Control in return for self-governance in different parts of the divided state. Manmohan Singh sought to revive these talks soon after Musharraf’s ouster from power. This was the “good news” Zardari promised to the nation in his first press conference after taking over the presidency.

Left to himself, Zardari would have followed in Musharraf’s footsteps. But after the Kerry-Lugar fiasco and the NRO judgement, he is not in a position to bypass the foreign ministry and the military establishment in policy-making on issues of national security. In a welcome departure from past practice, the government’s response to the Indian offer of talks has been prepared after careful deliberation involving all the institutions concerned.

The position taken by Foreign Minister Qureshi on Musharraf’s backchannel deal with Manmohan Singh on Kashmir is particularly welcome. On Feb 7 he rejected repeated claims made by his predecessor Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri that the Kashmir dispute had been close to settlement through backchannel diplomacy under the Musharraf regime. Qureshi said that if the previous government had been negotiating with India on any such proposal, it was a “secret” between some “selected individuals.” It had never been debated in the government and there was no record of it in the foreign ministry. If Qureshi’s statement means that the government has now decided to repudiate the deal that Musharraf was negotiating, it is probably the most sensible foreign policy decision that this government has taken.

Qureshi also said that though backchannel diplomacy was important, disputes between nations were always resolved through formal talks. Since this government has also named former foreign secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan as its envoy for talks with India, it owes an explanation to the nation on where it stands on the question of backchannel diplomacy. Was our emissary’s meeting with S K Lambah last November in Bangkok a “secret” between “selected individuals” like those under the Musharraf regime, or was it a part of formal talks? And if it was wrong for Musharraf to negotiate through the backchannel, why is it right for this government to do the same?

Qureshi was right, though, in cautioning that a Kashmir settlement was unlikely during the tenure of the present government. That is not a tragedy because a settlement in the present international environment would be based on the status quo, which is what the Kashmiri people have been fighting against all these years. They have suffered a lot but they can wait because time is on their side.

After a long period of militancy, the movement for azadi has now entered a new phase. It has become a deeply rooted and broad-based political movement that cannot be suppressed indefinitely through brute force. Our policy should aim at generating international pressure on India to allow this movement to operate at the political level, while promoting links between the people in the two parts of the state through increased trade and travel across the Line of Control. The rest will follow.

Author: Asif Ezdi

The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service.
Source: The News Pakistan

Indo-Pak parleys

Probably it is due to Gen Kayani’s recent candid assertion to the NATO commanders that his prime concern was defence of Pakistan’s eastern borders (against India) rather than fighting the war on terror on the western front that has prompted the international community in pressurising India to resume talks with Pakistan. Pakistan must, therefore, view the Indian offer in its correct perspective and not fall prey to it. We certainly want better relations with India but not at the cost of Kashmir and water. India would try to talk as usual all about the sun and the moon but not on Kashmir and water, exasperating and frustrating Pakistan to the extent of quitting the talks.

No one among today’s politicians is shrewder than Z A Bhutto in diplomacy. But even he could not make Swaran Singh utter a single word on Kashmir in his 22-day-long parleys in Murree in May/June 1965. At the end of the unsuccessful marathon Swaran Singh triumphantly confided to the pressmen that his sole aim was to gain time which he had done. So did Shastri to Ayub Khan at Tashkent, and made him walk away from the talks just out of frustration as Shastri wouldn’t talk about Kashmir. Kosygin, sensing the abrupt deadlock, asked Ayub if he was a chess player. Ayub, sort of nonplussed by such a question, said: “No, why?” “Because it is his (Shastri’s) move and that you must sit at the table till he moved”, was Kosygin’s cool reply. Ayub resumed his seat but was mercifully relieved when Shastri left to meet his Maker.

Gandhi kept on talking for hours on end on cabbage to a bewildered Mountbatten, who had invited him for the first time for a serious discussion on the future of India. Indians are past masters in the art of frustrating others during parleys and talks, and we must, therefore, make it quite clear to them that we want to talk, but about Kashmir and water.

Author: Col (r) Riaz Jafri
From, Rawalpindi, Pakistan

DAMN THE DIALOGUE

(There is palpable anger in Pakistan over the dams that India has built in Kashmir over the rivers whose water belongs to Pakistan under the Indus Basin Water Treaty. The headlines in Pakistani newspapers say, “Pakistan being made a desert by Indian Dams in Kashmir”. But India is too cocky to care. Pakistani would like their government to show some guts and spine to protect Pakistan’s water rights. India would rather have a war because it feels it can win because Pakistan is fighting insurrection on its western border. Pakistanis realise that and are ready. +Usman Khalid+)

Since our independence 63 years ago, India has not accepted us as a sovereign State. This, therefore, precludes any possibility of being accepted as a neighbour, what to talk of being accepted on equal terms. The Indian dream of “Akhand Bharat” (Greater India) has turned into a nightmare. Their strategy of coercion has evolved from one form to another without check, transcending into a state of frenzy. They have done well on a number of accounts though. Occupation of Jammu and Kashmir was a success; annexation of Hyderabad and Junagarh was a success; waging of three wars on Pakistan and dismemberment of East Pakistan, with the world watching, was another success. Development of large Armed Forces, their nuclear capable Army, Navy and Air Force ranking very high in numerical ratings worldwide, was yet another success. These successes have allowed them to remain in a state of euphoria, encouraging them to explore new avenues in their specialization of hegemony. They are the pioneers of “Water Terrorism”, a term not known to the world earlier. They want to turn Pakistan, the breadbasket of the Sub Continent into a desert, and Bangladesh into a swamp.

Generous as they are, they want Afghanistan to say thank you, by building dams on their rivers flowing into Pakistan, by allowing a free run to their RAW but not so raw, by allowing their Military Trainers into Afghanistan and by getting into the Guinness Book of World Records by establishing a record number of Consulates and “Trade” Offices to export terrorists to Pakistan. The biggest so called democracy of the world, “Shining India” treats its minorities like “Dalits”, a low life form, something the west would probably never understand. Turning the Golden Temple red with the blood of Sikhs, custodial killings in Occupied Kashmir, mass graves, dishonouring women, Babri Mosque, torching of Churches, the festering wounds of Naxals and Maoists are manifestations of their Human Rights record.

Their Miss Worlds are a world away from the thousands of their like, who are being herded like cattle and sold in the region for a shameful life into oblivion. With her ambition for a Blue Water Navy, a distant dream, she has excelled in “Naval Warfare” to dazzle the World. All this with great success, the World sees their Oscars and not what is shown in the Slum Dog Millionaire! Imaginative as they are, with Bollywood and its stunt masters as their Gurus, they have of late excelled in the art of drama. Whether it be the storming of their Parliament, the Samjhota Express, a train that runs between India and Pakistan, shooting down of an unarmed Naval Aircraft on a training mission or Mumbai attacks, they turn reality into fiction – Oscars for them again! Followers of Chankya and Kutalya, they have a history full of deceit. I knew General Deepak Kapoor was deaf, did not know he was dumb too. Taking on China and Pakistan together and sorting them out in 96 hours, some imagination!

India rumbles on, with her cap full of feather: Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, a little set back with the LTTE in Sri Lanka but that is just a slight hiccup. A nuclear deal with the US; more with UK and France; successful missile tests; nuclear submarines; another aircraft carrier; contracts for an enormous fleet of state of the art aircraft; and scantily clad American cheerleaders at IPL cricket matches - all is hunky dory. From the Cold Start through Escalations and Stand Offs, all was well - fully coercive, but with no scope for talks. Why this change of heart all of a sudden? A host of theories are making the rounds but I will not dwell on them, for the time being.

Talk we must, but from a position of strength. We need to give up our attitude of appeasement which has crept into us during the last three decades. They threaten us with Surgical Strikes, increase infiltration when they like, turn off the water tap when they like. They outline the Cold Start Doctrine and want to turn our country into a wasteland. Surely, our “Aman Ki Asha” is taken as a sign of weakness as our self proclaimed intellectuals, experts and human rights activists talk of Kashmir and Balochistan in the same context, cementing this perception. Let us talk about Kashmir, Sir Creek, Siachin, your interference in FATA and Balochistan and the cost of our fighting the Global War on Terror. Let us talk of the “help” that you are providing by trying to tie us down on our Eastern and Western Frontiers. Let the dialogue be Composite and fruitful and not another sham. And stop threatening us, with your Gunboat Diplomacy, please; for your Cold Start could be met with a “Hot Start”, much too hot for your liking. You try and kill us with thirst - Damn your Dialogue. ++

Author: Sohaila Salam

India’s success and Bangladesh’s failure

We have conceded everything that India wanted but we have not managed to receive anything in return except the warmth of India’s friendship. One wonders whether this friendship is between the peoples of two neighbouring countries or between the two parties that have come to power here and in India, writes Professor M Maniruzzaman Miah

THE prime minister Sheikh Hasina was in the Indian capital on a four-day state visit, from January 10 to 13. She was invited to visit India by Manmohan Singh, the prime minister of India. For quite sometime before her visit began, media propaganda in respect of the success she would attain there reached its crescendo. It appeared as though all the outstanding problems between Bangladesh and India would be settled during her visit because of the personal ‘chemistry’ between her and the Indian policymakers, as one minister remarked. Those who have been keeping track of the Indo-Bangladesh relation since 1972 know it very well what a tortuous course it has gone through. However, three days before the prime minister’s visit began, Ashraful Islam, the Awami League general secretary and a minister, and the day before Dipu Moni, the foreign minister at a Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies discussion meet, threw cold water on people’s high expectations. By that time one would hazard the guess that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs got to know from the visit here of Nirupama Rao, the Indian foreign secretary, how things were going to shape up in the Indian capital. Anyway, it was Bangladesh prime minister’s maiden visit to Delhi after her assumption of office as prime minister for the second time. It was expected, therefore, that she would be given a very warm welcome. And so was it. At the Rashtrapati Bhaban she was accorded a ceremonial red carpet reception. The Indian president awarded her the prestigious Indira Gandhi Prize for peace, disarmament and development.

Besides, she met quite a few influential ministers and high-profile personalities including Sonia Gandhi and former prime minister IK Gujral. On the face of it, she was treated very warmly and well. What Bangladeshis would like to know, however, is the outcome of it all. To be more precise, if a balance sheet of our gains and losses from the visit are made what it would look like. All the events that took place during the prime minister’s visit have been listed and covered in the joint communiqué that was released to the press on the conclusion of the visit. What does the joint communiqué say?

The 51-paragraph communiqué does not perhaps warrant the finesse of a seasoned diplomat to make out what actually it is. Summarily speaking, as one can see, it has two major parts, the accords signed in Delhi, and the main body of the communiqué itself. The accords signed comprise three agreements, one memorandum of understanding and a cultural exchange programme. The agreements include one on ‘mutual legal assistance’ another on ‘transfer of sentenced persons’ and the third one on ‘combating international terrorism, organised crime, and illicit drug trafficking’.

Interestingly enough, the full text of none of these has been released to the press till now, although more than three weeks have passed by since the return of the prime minister to Dhaka. In the absence of such a text, it is not very clear as to what type of criminal matters for legal assistance or transfer (not mutual, why?) of sentenced persons or organised crimes are meant in these accords. May we be permitted to note here that before the Chittagong Hill Tracts agreement was signed in 1997 several thousand rebels of Chittagong origin were engaged in organised crimes of looting, arson, killing, extortion, etc from Indian soil assisted by whom, one wonders! Even now on our south-western border, groups of large number of people under the banner of ‘Bangasena’ or ‘Bangabhumi Andolon’ whose avowed purpose is to slice away a chunk of Bangladesh territory are active. Then, there are a large number of Bangladeshis who fled and reportedly have found shelter in Kolkata from where they still continue extortion threatening over telephone to pay a handsome amount of money to their agents here. Will they come under the agreement of transfer? Perhaps not, for the simple reason that they have not been proceeded against or sentenced.

Our Indian friends want, as it appears, one or two rebels belonging to the United Liberation Front of Asom, who might have been interned somewhere in this country to be handed over to them. Reportedly, one Rajkhowa, an ULFA leader, is in Indian hands under very mysterious circumstances. Another, one Anup Chetia, according to newspaper reports, is perhaps the other person to be handed over to the Indian authorities.

There is nothing wrong in mutual exchange of rebellious people rising against the country’s integrity. But in all fairness, it should have been a two-way traffic. One wonders whether those Bangabhumi-wallahs and the extortionists or terrorists operating from Kolkata or somewhere in West Bengal would be brought to justice and those among them who are Bangladeshis will be handed over to the government of Bangladesh. Also whether or not the commitment made that they won’t allow their respective territory for training, sanctuary and other operations by domestic or foreign terrorist organisations will be fulfilled in letter and spirit.

As mentioned above, one agreement relates to ‘combating international terrorism’. That the presence of international terrorist outfits in Bangladesh may be there cannot perhaps be gainsaid. However, their operational strength is so weak that they have been and they can still be, we believe, controlled by the Bangladesh government itself. Internationalising the issue may pose security problem for us, as some would look at it. We think we need extreme caution to handle the matter.

It is not unexpected that the two prime ministers ‘underscored the need for both countries to actively cooperate on security issues.’ And both leaders reiterated the assurance that the territory of either would not be allowed for activities inimical to the other and resolved not to allow their respective territory to be used for training, sanctuary and operations by domestic or foreign terrorists. This is no doubt a welcome assertion. Let us hope that this would be followed in letter and spirit by both and some of the issues referred to above will not recur anymore and people involved in anti-Bangladesh terrorist activities in India will be handed over to Bangladesh.

‘It has been agreed’ that India will be allowed the ‘use of Mongla and Chittagong seaports for movement of goods to and from India through road and rail.’

It has been ‘agreed’ that Ashuganj in Bangladesh and Silghat in India will be ports of call for inland water traffic.It has also been ‘agreed’ that Agartala will be linked with Akhaura by rail line which will be laid out by Indian finance to be received as grant.

Thus, India will have through passage from any point in that country to Chittagong port and onward to Akhaura by railway up to Agartala in Tripura, that is, transit route from any point in India to another point of the same country, a facility which she has been asking for since quite sometime past. During the earlier period of Awami Rule, transit facility to India could not be granted because of fierce opposition from the people here. Incidentally, to facilitate rail link to Agartala which could have been otherwise cut off from India, Radcliffe in 1947 awarded the Muslim majority areas like Badarpur, Karimganj and Baroigram junctions in the district of Karimganj albeit people of these areas voted massively in favour of Pakistan in the plebiscite prior to Redcliffe award. Thus, what India got as a narrow passage 63 years ago has now got a wide area as transit route to the same place.

But what does the communiqué tell us about some of the burning issues bedevilling our relationship like the Border Security Force of India killing innocent Bangladeshis along the border, sometimes mutilating their body before returning and at others not returning at all, or the yawning trade gap between the two countries or the issue of water-sharing and a host of others. On border killing by India’s BSF, the phraseology used is ‘check cross-border

crime’ and ‘both prime ministers have agreed that the respective border guarding forces exercise restraint.’

By the above not only shooting down Bangladeshis like game birds day in and day out (818 over last 10 years, 94 last year), the Bangladesh Rifles has been bracketed with the BSF. One wonders whether this is just and fair because there is no record of the BDR killing innocent Indians at normal times.

As to the trade gap, India has agreed to reduce the negative list of items to be exported from Bangladesh and also to remove the tariff and non-tariff barriers. Those items have not been listed though in the communiqué but as to the removal of non-tariff barrier, lo and behold, some businesspeople have already been denied visa to visit India. On top of that ‘haats’ have been agreed to be set up on the border, although the modalities are yet to be put in place. It may be recalled that border haats were established after liberation but later on were closed as they became uneconomic.

On Teesta water sharing, it has been proposed that a meeting of the Joint River Commission would be held soon to come to an agreement on the issue. One may recall that a memorandum of understanding was agreed upon between the two governments in 1983 but was never translated into a full-fledged agreement understandably because of non-cooperation from the upper riparian. The memo, as it appears, agreed to allocate 36 per cent to Bangladesh, 39 per cent to India and 25 per cent as environmental flow down the river.

Before any agreement is reached, the two sides must reach unanimity on the flow upstream, an allocation of a minimum of 25 per cent of flow as environmental flow for the sustenance of the river itself and an agreement for joint monitoring of the river flows along its course upstream of the Indian barrage. Unless this is done it will have the same fate of the 1996 Ganges Treaty due to which a large number of distributaries have gone dry and are still drying up

gradually in spite of the fact that

70 per cent of the dry season flow

of the Ganges is contributed by Nepal.

As to the Tipaimukh dam, our prime minister says that her counterpart has assured her that India won’t take any measure that would put Bangladesh in any difficulty. Madam prime minister, may I be permitted to say that the same assurance was given to Khaleda Zia on the Farakka issue when she met the Indian prime minister PV Narsimha Rao in 1992. Such assurances have never been actually followed by action.

India has agreed to give dredger to us for dredging our rivers. Do people know that dredging has been necessitated by sedimentation on the river beds in turn, resulting from low flow from upstream?

We have also assured India of our support to her seeking a permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.

There are many things more which space does not permit us to go for. Summarily speaking, we have conceded everything that India wanted without getting practically anything in return except the warmth of relationship and friendship of India.

However, one wonders whether this friendship is between the peoples of two neighbouring countries or between the two parties that have come to power here and in India. We say so because the communiqué notes that ‘… Recent elections in both countries presented them with a historic opportunity to write a new chapter in their relationship.’

Everyone in this country with minimum common sense will look for friendship between two countries based on sovereign equality and mutual respect for each other’s needs for development and general welfare and perhaps not between two political parties that may come to power fortuitously at the same time.

By Professor M Maniruzzaman Miah

Professor M Maniruzzaman Miah is a former vice-chancellor of Dhaka